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DEFINED BENEFIT PLAN FUNDING:
How MUCH Is Too MUCH?
Regina T. Jeffersont
INTRODUCTION
T HE impetus behind the establishment of current pension law
was to provide appropriate incentives for the growth of private
pension plans and at the same time improve their basic soundness
and equitable character. When Congress enacted the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), t it identified
t Assistant Professor, Catholic Umversity, Columbus School of Law. I wish to thank
my mentor, Daniel Halpenn, who read and critiqued this work. His support of me, in
general, and this project, in particular, has been immeasurable. I cannot thank him
enough. I also wish to thank Jessica Schaffer for her extremely helpful research
assistance.
1. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act, better known as ERISA, is a mas-
sive piece of legislation. ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of I.R.C. and 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992)). Its ongin can be traced to President Kennedy's 1962 Econormc Report in which
he stated that there was a need for review of the rules governing investment policies of
pension plans and the effects on equity and efficiency of the tax pnvileges afforded to
pension plans. More than a decade later, President Ford signed ERISA into law on Sep-
tember 2, 1974. The Act completely revised the legal framework of the qualified pension
plan as it had previously existed. The most significant innovations of ERISA concerned
participation, vesting, and funding standards. Junsdiction over employee benefits under
ERISA was divided among the. Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Labor, and
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.
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adequate funding over the life of a plan and on plan termination as
a critical element in accomplishing these goals. Accordingly,
ERISA imposed minimum levels of funding under its labor require-
ments2 and as a prerequisite to the retention of certain tax benefits
afforded to qualified pension plans.'
Plans which operationally meet the requirements of Internal
Revenue Code section 401(a) are said to be qualified plans. The
qualified status of the plan entitles the employer as well as plan
participants to substantial tax advantages. The first tax advantage is
that employer contributions are deductible by the employer when
made, but are not taxed until they are distributed to the employee.
This is an exception to the general rule that an employer cannot
take a deduction for salary related expenditures as an ordinary and
necessary business expense under Internal Revenue Code section
162 prior to the time that the employee includes the payment in
income. The exception allows the employer to receive an accelerat-
ed deduction. The second tax advantage to qualified plans is that
income earned on the accumulated contributions is not taxable until
distribution.' This allows a tax-free build-up of investment income.
The tax-free build-up is the essence of the tax favorable treatment
of qualified pension plans.6
While sufficient funding was recognized as one of the primary
goals of ERISA, Congress continued the maximum funding limita-
tions which capped the deduction for amounts contributed to a
qualified plan in a plan year by an employer.' Moreover, in an
effort to further discourage "overfunding," a ten percent excise tax
2. Title I of ERISA, commonly referred to as the "labor title," is concerned with the
protection of employee benefit rights and is generally enforced by the Department of
Labor. ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1003 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
3. Qualified pension plans are plans that comply with I.R.C. § 401(a) and the regula-
tions thereunder in both form and operation. I.R.C. § 401(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
They must, for example, meet minimum participation, vesting, and funding standards.
Usually, before placing the plan in operation, employers will request a Determination
Letter from the Internal Revenue Service approving their proposed plans and related trusts.
However, employers are not required to obtain this determination.
4. I.R.C. §§ 402(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), 404(a)(1)-(a)(3) (1988).
5. Id. § 501(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
6. For an explanation of the time value of money and a description of how the tim-
ing of the deduction and the inclusion of income do not necessarily have advantageous
effects if the tax rates remain constant, see Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Tax-
ing the "Time Value of Money," 95 YALE L.J. 506 (1986).
7. I.R.C. § 404(a)(1)(A) (1988).
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was imposed, as of January 1, 1987, on all nondeductible contribu-
tions.
Legislative history suggests9 that Congress was driven by two
concerns in establishing the maximum funding limitation: (1) Con-
gress did not believe it appropriate to extend tax subsidized bene-
fits to amounts in excess of the funding limitations,W° and (2) it
believed that accelerated funding creates an incentive for employers
to terminate their plans in order to recapture surplus assets, a prac-
tice referred to as "asset reversion."'" Asset reversion occurs when
a plan terminates, and there are excess assets in the plan which are
permitted under law to revert to the employer. Even if the con-
cerns of Congress are legitimate, the recent emphasis on
overfunding creates a risk that plans will be insufficiently funded
and is, therefore, inconsistent with the established policy of encour-
aging adequate funding. The goal of this paper is to offer a means
of reconciling these competing interests.
The subject of asset reversion is controversial. 2 A number of
highly publicized plan terminations led to reversions and caused a
political uproar in the early to mid 1980's. 3 Congress responded
by limiting deductible contributions and establishing new excise
taxes on nondeductible contributions and reversions. The deduction
restrictions and excise tax on nondeductible contributions made
surpluses less likely to occur while the excise tax on reversions
made the recovery of surplus assets less desirable. Collectively,
these changes have succeeded in essentially bringing accelerated
funding and the removal of excess plan assets to a halt.' How-
8. Id. § 4972(a) (1988).
9. Overfunded Pension Plans: Joint Hearing before the Select Comm. on Aging and
the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the Comm. on Education and Labor,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-5 (1985) [hereinafter Hearings] (opening statement of Edward R.
Roybal, Chairman).
10. The full funding limitation sets a ceiling on the maximum deduction an employer
may receive for contributions made to a plan. I.R.C. § 404(a)(1)(A) (1988).
11. See infra text accompanying note 44.
12. See generally Pension Asset Raids, Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Aging,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (discussing pension plan terminations to recover excess assets
and in particular, Harper & Row Publisher's termination of their pension plan).
13. See Walsh v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 726 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1983) (class
action under ERISA to block employer asset reversion of approximately $250 million);
District 65, UAW v. Harpers & Row, Publishers, 576 F. Supp. 1468 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (ac-
tion brought by union under ERISA because employer terminated a retirement plan in
order to obtain surplus assets of plan).
14. See Employee Benefit Research Institute, Questions and Answers about Employee
Benefits, EBRI IssuE BRinE 78, May 1988, at 10 (Table 12) [hereinafter EBRI IssuE
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ever,' in addition to deterring tax avoidance schemes, these laws
also deter legitimate "overfunding." In some instances, they may
ultimately lead to asset shortages. Thus, the recently enacted fund-
ing restrictions could prove to be very costly for plan participants
in the future.
Ideally, the role of policymakers is to make laws which effec-
tuate change consistent with public interest. However, in order for
policy makers to meet this demand, it is necessary for them to
identify distinct issues and their respective causes and long term
effects. In furtherance of this goal, as it relates to the issue of
accelerated funding of qualified defined benefit plans, this Article
will address the following questions: (1) whether it is practical to
separate the concept of accelerated funding from impending plan
termination, (2) whether the removal of excess assets from termi-
nating plans can be deterred in ways which offset tax-subsidized
gains attributable to overfunded amounts rather than in ways which
discourage accelerated funding, and (3) whether, in the absence of
concerns relating to plan termination, accelerated funding is consis-
tent with pension policy.
I. DEFINED BENEFIT PLAN FUNDING
A. Funding Requirements
A defined benefit plan pools the plan's assets in an aggregate
trust fund and promises a fixed amount to plan participants at
retirement, without regard to the plan's investment performance."5
The defined benefit plan usually provides a monthly payment of
the retirement benefit over the life of the employee and a surviving
spouse. The benefit amount is determined by a formula which is
usually a function of the participant's compensation and service.
This distinguishes it from a defined contribution plan where the
employer makes annual contributions to individual participant ac-
counts; the accounts are invested, and the employee receives the
entire account balance on retirement. 16
While the retirement benefit itself is definitely determinable in
BRIEF] (stating that increase in asset reversions in the early 1980s has slowed and re-
versed by 1988).
15. Defined benefit plan is defined in I.R.C. § 414(i) (1988) and ERISA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(34) (1988). Defined contribution plan is defined in I.R.C. § 4140) (1988) and
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (1988).
16. See supra note 15.
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a defined benefit plan, the costs of future benefits are based upon
actuarial estimates of future salary increases, investment yields,
mortality, and turnover. The use of actuarial estimates in conjunc-
tion with funding methods enables the employer to systematically
allocate plan costs over the life of the plan in order to avoid large
plan costs in relatively short periods as plan obligations become
due.
1 7
Funding methods may be classified in several ways. One
criteria of classification is whether costs are determined by using
accrued benefits'" or projected benefits. '9 If plan costs are deter-
mined on the basis of accrued benefits, the cost for the current
year, referred to as the "normal cost," is the actuarial present value
of the benefits accrued in a given year. If the costs are based on
projected benefits, the normal cost is generally the level percentage
of pay necessary per year to fund the projected benefits for all
years of service.' Thus, the normal cost allocates future plan
costs over the life of the plan and will vary depending on the
funding method selected.
Past service liability occurs when an employer gives credit for
service prior to the date on which the plan is established." Pro-
spectively viewed, the past service liability, or accrued liability, is
the amount that, together with future plan costs, is expected to
cover all benefit costs under the plan. The excess of the accrued
liability over the plan's assets is the "unfunded accrued liabili-
ty.,
2 2
17. "Funding method" is synonymous with the term "actuarial cost method." A funding
method is a recognized technique to determine what portion of a pension's cost should be
attributed to the present year, prior years, and future years. There are many different
funding methods. ERISA does not mandate that any particular method be used; however,
ERISA does specify six acceptable methods. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(31) (1988). Once a method
is selected for a plan, it may not be changed without the permission of the Internal Reve-
nue Service. I.R.C. § 412(c)(5) (1988).
18. The accnued benefit in a defined benefit plan is equal to the sum of pension cred-
its earned for the number of years of service to date expressed in terms of annual bene-
fits beginning at normal retirement age. Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-7(a)(1) (as amended in
1988).
19. The projected benefit is the benefit the participant expects to receive at normal
retirement age provided she does not terminate employment before such time. For a dis-
cussion of this subject, see DAN M. MCGILL & DONALD S. GRUBBS, JR., FUNDAMENTALS
OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 292-94 (6th ed. 1989).
20. See id. at 292.
21. The past service liability is also referred to as the "accrued liability." Despite its
name, the accrued liability of a plan is not an accounting or legal liability. See infra note
35.
22. I.R.C. § 412(b)(2)(B) (1988). For explanation of actuarial cost methods, see
1993]
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An employer is required to contribute annually the entire
normal cost of the plan. The supplemental costs of the plan are to
be amortized over a specified period. In addition to the accrued
liability, supplemental costs consist of amounts resulting from plan
amendments, experience losses,' and losses caused by changes in
24actuarial assumptions. The amortization period for the initial past
service liability, liabilities resulting from plan amendments, and
changes in actuarial assumptions is thirty years.' Net experience
losses are amortized over fifteen years.26
While the primary function of an advanced funding method is
to apprise the employer of the estimated rate at which the obliga-
tions under the plan will accrue, these projections are also used to
calculate the funding limitations.27 Thus, to the extent that ad-
vanced funding methods can accurately predict actual plan experi-
ence, they provide financial security to plan participants. To the
extent that they systematically allocate cost among plan years, they
ensure that an equitable apportionment of plan costs, plan deduc-
tions, and plan contributions occur over the life of the plan.
1. Pre-ERISA Funding Law
The pension law prior to ERISA was inadequate in providing
sufficient financial security for plan participants and equitably
apportioning benefit costs over the life of the plan. During this
period, there were no specific advanced funding requirements. As* a
consequence, many of the problems which arose were related to
underfunding. Plans which fully complied with the existing statuto-
ry requirements terminated with insufficient assets.28 Benefits were
McGiLL & GRUBBS, supra note 19, at 267-68.
23. Experience losses occur when actual plan costs exceed the actuarial estimates for a
given plan year. For example, if the actuary assumes that the plan investments will earn
8% and the investment earned only 5%, the plan will have a deficiency, or an actuarial
loss.
24. Supplemental costs also include waived funding deficiencies. These occur when the
Secretary of the Treasury, acting through the Internal Revenue Service, waives part or all
of a plan's annual contribution upon a showing of substantial financial hardship such that
making the plan contribution would adversely affect plan participants. I.R.C. § 412(d)
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
25. Id. § 412(b)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii), (v) (1988). For plans in existence on January 1, 1974,
the period of amortization is 40 years. Id. § 412(b)(2)(B)(i).
26. Id. § 412(b)(2)(B)(iv).
27. Id. § 412(c) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). I.R.C. §§ 412(c)(6) and 404(a)(l)(A) set the
minimum funding standard and the maximum deduction an employer may receive for
contributions, respectively.
28. See infra note 39 (describing the Studebaker case).
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occasionally funded under "pay as you go" arrangements. Under
these methods, retirement benefits were treated as payroll costs and
were paid directly to plan participants by the employer.29 The em-
ployer annually calculated the cost of retirement benefits and fund-
ed the benefits in full as each participant reached retirement age.30
To the extent that the benefits were reasonable in amount, they
were deductible from the employer's gross income as an ordinary
and necessary business expense and were taxable to the recipient as
ordinary income upon receipt.3 While these plans did not seek
the preferential tax treatment afforded to qualified plans,32 they,
nevertheless, created concern about the adequacy of their funding.
Accordingly, Title F imposed funding requirements on most em-
ployer sponsored plans, qualified as well as non-qualified. 4
Prior to ERISA, qualified plans had additional funding require-
ments, although not explicitly set forth in the Internal Revenue
Code. As early as 1946, the Internal Revenue Service issued a
ruling stating that any time a plan had liabilities greater than those
which existed at the time the plan was established, the Service
29. See Donald S. Grubbs, Jr., Funding, in PENSION AND PROrr-SHARING PLANS,
SERIES D, FOLIO 1, at 1, 7 (David C. Rothman ed., 1978) (discussing pay as you go
funding arrangements).
30. The employer's cash outlay under "pay as you go" methods was usually low dur-
ing the early years of the plan because the number of retired employees was relatively
small and no provisions were made to fund the accruing benefits of those employees who
were continuing in service. However, as the employee group aged, the number of retirees
constantly increased until eventually retirement benefits were a significant percentage of
payroll costs. As a result, the annual outlay, expressed as a percentage of payroll, reached
a very high level.
31. See McGiLL & GRUBBS, supra note 19, at 450-51 (discussing how the exemption
from federal income tax of investment income from qualified plans influences the manage-
ment of plan assets).
32. See Halperin, supra note 6, at 541-42 (discussing methods that nonqualified plan
sponsors use to achieve the benefit of exemption despite not being afforded preferential
tax treatment under the Internal Revenue Code).
33. See supra notes 2 and 3.
34. "Top-hat" plans and other non-qualified plans are generally exempt from most of
the ERISA requirements. A "top-hat" plan is "unfunded and is maintained by an employer
primarily for the purpose of providing deferred compensation for a select group of man-
agement or highly compensated employees." JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK,
PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 148-49 (1990) (quoting ERISA § 201(2)). While
these types of plans are not subject to the Internal Revenue Code limitations on qualified
plans, they are ostensibly subject to the requirements of ERISA. They are excepted from
the participation, vesting, funding, fiduciary responsibility, and plan termination insurance
provisions of ERISA; however, they are not exempt from the reporting and disclosure
requirements of Title I of ERISA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051(2), 1081(3), l101(a)(1) (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992) and I.R.C. § 501 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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might treat the plan as if it had terminated. This meant that all of
the accrued benefits of plan participants would immediately vest.
Thus, the employer became obligated to pay benefits to employees
who had not remained in employment long enough to obtain non-
forfeitable benefits under the plan's regular vesting schedule.a5
Therefore, to avoid higher costs, employers were forced to make
annual contributions which covered the plan's current cost and
interest on the unfunded past service liability. 6 As a consequence,
the requirement that a plan be deemed to have terminated in the
absence of regular contributions effectively created a minimum
funding limitation. 7 Even so, the pre-ERISA funding laws and
practices created a climate of uncertainty and instability for pension
benefits.3" Inadequate funding regulations resulted in benefits
which often proved to be totally illusory when employers did not
comply with existing funding requirements and partially illusory
when they did comply.39
35. In 1946, the IRS issued a ruling that stated that, in order to avoid being consid-
ered terminated, a plan was required to make contributions large enough and often enough
to avoid having liabilities greater than when the plan was first established. As a result,
the plan's liabilities would never increase. Contributions large enough to cover the normal
cost and the interest on the unfunded past service liability generally met this requirement.
A plan has a past service cost when the employer elects to give credit for service before
the establishment of the plan. Past service cost is the present value of benefits attributable
to past service. In other words, it is the amount needed today to provide the portion of
the benefit attributable to past service payable at retirement. The present value of past
service cost increases as benefits become closer to payment status. Thus, when a plan is
not adequately funded, the plan's assets will not grow at a rate sufficient to prevent the
past service liability from increasing. Therefore, to prevent the past service cost from
increasing, the employer must contribute a sum equal to the interest that would have been
earned if there had been sufficient assets. Prior to ERISA, it was only necessary for the
employer to contribute the interest on the unpaid portion of the unfunded past service
liability plus the plans current expenses referred to as the "normal cost." Accordingly, the
plan's liabilities could not increase unless the plan was amended. See PENSION AND PROF-
IT SHARING 2d, PRE-ERISA REGULATIONS AND RULINGS, 169, 556, at 69, 504 (Maxwell
MacMillan 1991) (citing P.S. No. 57 which was later modified, and finally declared obso-
lete by Rev. Rul. 70-278).
36. Current cost is synonymous with normal cost. See supra text accompanying notes
20-21.
37. The regulations also addressed certain funding concepts as a means of determining
whether a complete discontinuance of contributions occurred for purposes of requiring
vesting. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-6(c) (1963). For an explanation of vesting under ERISA, see
BARBARA J. COLEMAN, PRIMER ON ERISA 31-34 (3d ed. 1989) (describing the earning of
nonforfeitable rights to pension benefits as the "heart of ERISA").
38. McGILL & GRUBBS, supra note 19, at 48-51.
39. PRESIDENT'S COMMITTE ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE RE-
TIREMENT AND WELFARE PROGRAMS, PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE PENSION PROGRAMS:
A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON PRIVATE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PLANS 50 (Jan. 1965).
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Prior to ERISA, employers could not take unlimited deduc-
tions for contributions to the plan, which suggests a concern for
overfunding. During periods when the economy rose and tax rates
were high, employers could accelerate funding by making excess
contributions to their pension plans in order to obtain larger tax
deductions.' These contributions were often attributed to amounts
paid in connection with past service liabilities as opposed to cur-
rent ones." As a result, pre-ERISA maximum deduction rules lim-
ited annual deductions for contributions on account of past service
liability to ten percent of total past service liability.
ERISA liberalized this rule to allow the past service liability
to be amortized over ten years.42 The ten year amortization pay-
ment represents twelve to fifteen percent of the past service liabili-
ty, depending on the interest rate. Thus, using ten year amortiza-
tion, as permitted by ERISA, allows a larger deductible contribu-
tion than was allowed under pre-ERISA law.43
Another regulatory deficiency which existed prior to ERISA,
although not addressed until 1986, was the absence of legislation
sufficiently deterring plan revocation. With the exception of the
statutory requirement that all plan assets be held for the exclusive
benefit of plan participants and their beneficiaries, plan terminations
were generally not discouraged. Therefore, provided that all plan
One such case is the Studebaker case. The closing of the Studebaker automobile plant in
South Bend, Indiana, in December of 1963 'is regarded as an important event leading to
the enactment of ERISA. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 34, at 53-57. As a result
of the plant closing, 5,000 workers were dismissed and 1,800 more eventually lost their
jobs. Id. at 53. When the plant closed, the company entered into an agreement with the
United Automobile Workers (UAW) for the termination of its pension plan. Id. at 54. The
termination agreement implemented the default priorities contained in the plan. Id. It di-
vided the plan participants into three groups and paid their benefits accordingly: (1) 3,600
retirees and active workers who had already reached the plan's normal retirement age of
60 received their full benefits in the form of life annuities, (2) 4,000 employees age 40
to 59 who had at least 10 years of service with the employer received lump sum pay-
ments representing about 15 percent of the actuarial value of their accrued benefits, and
(3) 2,900 workers who had no vested rights received nothing. Id. The Studebaker closing
was not litigated. However, the plant closing did give rise to a lawsuit about the continu-
ation of a collectively bargained health program. UAW, Local 5 v. Studebaker Corp., 50
Lab. Cas. (CCH) 1 19,307 (N.D. Ind. 1964). This case made policy makers more aware
of the inadequacy of existing funding requirements and, as a result, caused them to focus
on plan funding and related matters.
40. See Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-1(b) (1963) (discussing tax deduction for employers who
make contributions to pension plans).
41. See, e.g., supra note 39 (describing the Studebaker case).
42. I.R.C. § 404(a)(1)(A)(iii) (1988).
43. Gnubbs, supra note 29, at 21.
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liabilities could be satisfied, an employer was free to revoke a trust
at any time and recapture the plan's excess assets without penal-
ty.44
2. Current Funding Law
In 1974, ERISA brought the issue of funding to the fore-
ground by establishing new minimum standards for pension fund-
ing.45 Congress wanted to encourage the establishment of qualified
plans. It also wanted to encourage the advanced funding of these
plans in order to better assure that benefits could be provided to
plan participants as promised.' As a result of these goals, ERISA
expanded the scope of requirements for qualified plan deductions
and required employers to contribute annually at least the normal
cost and the amount necessary to amortize any unfunded liability
over periods usually ranging from 15 to 40 years.47 Prior to
44. Asset reversions were deterred only to the extent that plans were subject to the
exclusive benefit rule. LANOBEIN & WOLK, supra note 34, at 517-18 (discussing the ex-
clusive benefit rule and its history). This rule operated to disqualify any plan if it en-
gaged in transactions that benefitted the employer rather than the plan participants. I.R.C.
§ 404(a)(1)(A)(i) & (c)(1) (1988). Accordingly, an employer could not terminate a plan
and recover the assets without first paying for the benefits that participants had accrued to
the date of termination. The absence of an excise or penalty tax in the event of a plan
termination or reversion suggests that no attempt was made to recover the tax gain attrib-
utable to the excess amounts recovered by the employer after the accrued benefit liability
had been satisfied. The 10% excise tax (increased to 15% in 1988) enacted in 1986 on
asset reversions is one method of recapturing some of the tax benefits for such amounts.
45. I.R.C. § 412 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
46. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 34, at 226-27 (discussing the change resulting
from ERISA which imposed minimum funding requirements where none existed prior to
its enactment). Congress also wanted to protect the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation
(PBGC), the agency established under Title IV of ERISA to function as the insurer of a
minimum guaranteed benefit for defined benefit pension plans. As insurer, the PBGC
assumes responsibility for the payment of benefits when a plan terminates with insufficient
assets. Thus, underfunding puts the PBGC at risk even though the plan sponsor is liable
to the PBGC for the amount necessary to pay guaranteed benefits up to the statutory
maximum. Originally, the PBGC was even more at risk because employers had an uncon-
ditional right to terminate their plans, provided they gave proper notice to the PBGC.
Moreover, the employer was not liable to the PBGC for unfunded insured benefits which
exceeded 30% of the net worth of the employer at the time of termination. With the
enactment of the Single-Employer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1986 (SEPPA), the
employer's ability to terminate plans with unfunded accrued benefits was restricted to dis-
tress situations. Furthermore, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 eliminated
the 30% limit on the employer's liability. As a result of these laws, the minimum funding
requirements have less importance today for PBGC protection than they did prior to 1986.
For a detailed explanation of PBGC liability, see MCGILL & GRUBBS, supra note 19, at
583-85.
47. Amortization periods have been liberalized, allowing for contributions up to the
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ERISA, employers had been required to make contributions suffi-
cient to cover the plan's normal cost and the interest on the plan's
initial actuarial liability.4 There had been no requirement to amor-
tize the unfunded liability."
Section 412 of the Internal Revenue Code provides the statuto-
ry guidelines for pension funding." Plan costs under section 412
are determined through an actuarial valuation.' The valuation pro-
cess uses an actuarial cost method to estimate plan cost and to
assign those costs to appropriate plan years.5 2 In order to produce
such estimates, the actuary must make assumptions about the future
experience of the plan including the rate of investment return on
plan assets, the mortality of plan participants and their beneficia-
ries, turnovers resulting in forfeitures of nonvested benefits, salary
increases, the retirement ages of plan participants, and the selection
of optional forms of benefit offered by the plan.53
In an effort to minimize the disparity between projected cost
estimates and actual plan experience, Congress imposed the require-
ment that plan assumptions be reasonable.' In other words, it is
necessary for the assumptions to reasonably reflect the plan's his-
torical performance or, if the plan is newly established, reasonably
predict its future experience.5 Therefore, the actuarial estimates
upon which a plan's funding is based must achieve a certain level
of accuracy when compared with actual plan experience. Not-
withstanding this requirement, actuarial assumptions can produce
only cost estimates, not actual costs. The actual cost of a plan is
the sum of benefit payments made to participants and their benefi-
ciaries, plus plan expenses, minus investment income on plan as-
sum of the normal cost plus a level payment of unfunded liability amortized over shorter
periods of time, but not less than 10 years in any event. See I.R.C. § 404(a)(l)(A)(iii)
(1988).
48. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
49. See supra note 35.
50. See LR.C. § 412 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
51. See id. § 412(b).
52. See id.
53. LANGBEIN & WoLK, supra note 34, at 228.
54. LRC. § 412(c)(3) (1988).
55. See I.RLC. § 412(c)(3)(B) (1988) (requiring that the assumptions offer the actuary's
best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan).
56. Prior to the Pension Protection Act of 1987 (PPA), individual actuarial assumptions
were required to be reasonable in the aggregate. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 34, at
228. PPA amended ERISA to require that each actuarial assumption be individually rea-
sonable. Pension Protection Act of 1987. Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 9307(b)(1), 101 Stat.
1330 (1987) (codified as I.R.C. § 412(c)(3) (1988)).
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sets. Therefore, it is unlikely that a plan will ever have assets
equal to the amount needed to provide the benefits actually accrued
under the plan." Consequently, a plan at any given time will
probably have too many or too few assets.
Congress furthered the adequate funding of pensions with
sanctions for any unsatisfied funding requirements. The sanctions
under ERISA55 reflect the perceived importance of deterring
underfunding as compared to overfunding: an underfunded plan is
subject to the imposition of a very high excise tax59 while, gener-
ally, an overfunded plan faces only the loss of a deduction for the
excess amount.' Under Title II of ERISA, the excise tax on a
funding deficiency is initially 5% of the deficiency.6 If it is not
corrected within 90 days after the employer receives notice of the
deficiency, there is an additional 100% tax.6' These taxes, which
effectively mandate adequate funding, are imposed as excise taxes
and, as a result, the employer is not permitted to deduct such
amounts for income tax purposes.63
Notwithstanding the fact that ensuring adequate contributions
was the primary focus of ERISA, it retained the pre-ERISA policy
of limiting excess contributions.' Accordingly, Congress continued
57. See EDWARD T. VEAL & EDWARD R. MACKIEWICZ, PENSION PLAN TERMINATIONS
§ 12.1 (1989) (asserting that incorrect actuarial assumptions and the permissible actuarial
methods cause this result).
58. I.R.C. §§ 4971(b) (applying an additional tax to underfunded programs), 4961
(providing an abatement of additional taxes after a correction is made), & 4963(e) (de-
fining the correction period) (1988).
59. I.R.C. § 4971(b) (1988). The qualified status of a plan is generally not affected by
a failure to meet the funding requirements. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 34, at 138.
However, if the plan's failure to meet the funding requirement constitutes a discontinuance
of contributions then the plan will be considered terminated. In addition, the Department
of Labor, the plan participants, and its fiduciaries may initiate a civil action to compel
the employer to comply with the funding requirements. ERISA § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(3) (1988).
60. See I.R.C. § 404(a)(1)(A) (1988) (providing for a limitation on deductions); Tax
Reform Act of 1986, § 1131(c), 100 Stat. 2085, 2477-78 (adding § 4972 with its in-
creased penalties). Under current law, effective January 1, 1987, if annual contributions
exceed deductible amounts, an employer not only faces the loss of a deduction but the
imposition of a 10% excise tax as well. I.R.C. § 4972(a) (1988). Some provision is made
for carry-overs which allow for subsequent deductions. I.R.C. § 404(a)(1)(E) (1988). How-
ever, because the recently imposed excise tax on nondeductible contributions remains
effective for as long as the plan is overfunded, the excise tax would seem to render car-
ry-overs impractical. See infra part Il.(B).
61. ERISA, § 1013(b), I.R.C. § 4971(a) (1988).
62. I.R.C. § 4971(b) (1988). The 100% tax can be waived by the IRS "in appropriate
cases." See ERISA § 3002(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1202(b) (1988).
63. I.R.C. § 275(a)(6) (1988).
64. See ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 1013(c), 88 Stat. 829, 921-24 (1974) (codified
[Vol. 44:1
DEFINED BENEFIT PLAN FUNDING
to limit how much an employer could contribute to a plan as a
deductible contribution in a given year. The rationale for the limi-
tation was that excess contributions did not constitute ordinary and
necessary business expenses and were more likely prepayments for
future years rather than present accruals.' Additionally, the regu-
lations expressed concern that excess contributions could revert to
the employer on termination.' Therefore, only amounts which fell
within the permissible limits were deductible. The rule which
overrides other rules of deductibility, provides that the tax deduc-
tion for a particular year cannot exceed the amount needed to bring
the plan to a fully funded status. That is, no deduction can be
taken for contributions that would raise the plan assets to a level
above the actuarial value of the plan's liabilities.67
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA), enacted in
1987, placed even greater restrictions on accelerated or over-
funding.' OBRA made significant changes to the existing full
funding limitdtion, which was based on the excess of a plan's
assets over its accrued liability, taking expected benefits into ac-
count.69 It introduced the concept of "current liability" in order to
further reduce the extent to which an employer is permitted to fund
a defined benefit plan.7" Under the current liability concept, con-
tribution levels are limited by treating the plan as if it terminat-
ed.7 In other words, the plan's obligations at a given time are
determined without regard to projections of future salary increases.
The current liability concept limits contributions to amounts neces-
sary to increase plan assets to equal the lesser of accrued liability
or 150% of current liability, regardless of the funding method
as amended I.R.C. § 404).
65. See Rev. Rul. 64-159, 1964-1 C.B. 163 (ruling that excess payments are not de-
ductible because they are not for services actually rendered); see also supra text accompa-
nying notes 18-19 (discussing the difference between using accrued benefits or projected
benefits to estimate costs); infra text accompanying note 86 (discussing the use of a bene-
fit plan as a savings account).
66. See Treas. Reg. § 1A01-2(b) (as amended in 1981) (defining when' excess contribu-
tions may revert to the employer).
67. See I.R.C. § 404(a)(1)(A) (1988).
68. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330-
57 (1987) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
69. See ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-409, § 1013(c), 88 Stat. 921-24 (1974) (codified as
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 404(a)(1) (1988)) (defining overfunding limitation).
70. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 9303,
101 Stat. at 1330-33 to 1330-34 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 412(l) (1988) (de-
fining current liability and limiting deductible contributions to that amount).
71. See L.C. § 412(l) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (describing current liability rules).
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used.72 Until the enactment of OBRA, it was believed that some
employers were able to make excessively large contributions by
projecting enormous benefit costs.
Current liability also prohibits funding particular benefits and
events.73 OBRA specifically provides that an employer may not
consider benefits conditioned upon unpredictable events as benefits
promised under the plan for deduction purposes.74 Thus, for pur-
poses of calculating current liability, all contingent unpredictable
liability, such as the likelihood of a plant shutting down or of
employing a large number of new hires in the future, is excluded
from funding allowances while more reliable and predictable events
such as normal retirement and early retirement, are permitted.
The concept of current liability operates as a termination liability
assessment and is in fact referred to in the Act's legislative history
as "termination liability. 76
OBRA also imposed additional restrictions on the interest rate
assumptions that an actuary may use in computing a plan's current
liability.77 This was done in response to increasing concern over
the use of very low interest rate assumptions in conjunction with
tax avoidance schemes. Designed to maximize the tax deductibility
of employer contributions, reliance on low interest rates allowed
some employers to abuse the tax advantages afforded qualified
plans. Therefore, as of December 31, 1987, all costs, liabilities,
rates of interest, and other factors under the plan must be deter-
mined on the basis of actuarial assumptions which are individually
reasonable.7" Prior to this legislation, as noted earlier, actuarial
assumptions were required to be reasonable in the aggregate.79
The individually reasonable requirement gives the actuary less
flexibility in choosing plan assumptions. For example, the legisla-
tive history suggests that the individually reasonable interest rate
requirement effectively creates an "unsafe harbor" for those interest
rate assumptions which are not related to the current rates for 30-
72. I.R.C. § 412(c)(7)(A) (1988).
73. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
74. I.R.C. §§ 412(c)(7)(B), (1)(7)(B) (1988).
75. I.R.C. § 412()(7)(B) (1988).
76. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 495, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 843 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1245, 2313-1589-90.
77. See I.R.C. § 412(c)(3) (1988).
78. See supra note 56 (discussing the requirement of reasonableness).
79. See supra note 56.
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year government securities." Thus, once again, policy makers re-
acted to remedy a situation that they believed permitted deductions
for amounts not attributable to the plan year, thereby creating large
surpluses which could eventually revert to employers on plan ter-
mination.
B. The Occurrence of Overfunding
Some policy makers apparently fail to recognize that despite
efforts to minimize the difference between actuarial estimates and
actual plan experience, plan surpluses are frequently an unavoidable
consequence of actuarial science rather than a deliberate scheme for
tax avoidance. As a result, pension law, as it relates to accelerated
funding, reflects the suspicion that all excesses are inherently sinis-
ter and inseparable from the controversy over asset reversion.81
However, all accelerated funding is not necessarily motivated
by an employer's desire to temporarily take advantage of a tax
exemption with an eye toward future recovery. Conservative inter-
est rate assumptions are often used in an attempt to ensure that
adequate funds are available in the event of an early distribution
on account of death or disability.' The sponsor of a smaller plan
is more likely to be concerned about this aspect of funding because
an early distribution would have a greater effect on it than on a
larger plan.83 Accordingly, legitimate overfunding may occur when
a small employer intentionally uses conservative interest rate as-
sumptions in anticipation of early distributions. '
This was the position taken by a small employer in Jerome
Mirza & Associates v. United States where conservative interest
rates were allegedly used in order to avoid a shortfall in the event
of early distribution or poor investment perfonnance.Y The Inter-
nal Revenue Service took the position that the use of the 5% inter-
est rate assumption was unreasonably low.86 In view of the fact
80. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 495, 846, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2313-1592.
81. See VEAL & MACKIEWICZ, supra note 57, § 12.1.2, at 207-08 (1989) (discussing
plan terminations generally and more specifically, reversions to the employer).
82. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
83. See STEVEN T. ITELSON, SELECION OF INTEREST ASSUMPTIONS FOR PENSION PLAN
VALUATION 2 (1991) (Society of Actuaries No. 460-23-91).
84. See discussion infra part III (discussing overfunding in general).
85. In Jerome Mirza & Assoc. v. United States, 692 F. Supp. 918 (D. Ill. 1988), aff'd,
882 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 929 (1990), the plan used a 5%
rate, permitting larger deductions. The Service successfully challenged the use of the 5%
rate and imposed a less conservative rate of 8% in light of the fact that the plan's assets
were invested in certificates of deposit yielding at least 11%. Id. at 923.
86. See id. at 920. The taxpayer argued that in order to ensure that the plan would
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that Mr. Mirza was one of two participants in the plan, concern
about an early distribution appears legitimate, howeverY More-
over, the volatile investment climate which existed in the 1980's
could have also contributed to the employer's assessment of the
riskiness of less conservative assumptions. To illustrate, if the
Mirza plan assumed an interest rate of 8% and a retirement age of
65 and actually had an investment yield of 5% and one of the
participants died at age 55, the plan would not have enough money
to pay the death benefit. Consequently, it would be forced to ter-
minate. While death at 55 is unlikely, it is nevertheless not unrea-
sonable to fund for premature death in small plans where a mor-
tality assumption is meaningless. 88 Therefore, accelerated funding
in this situation appears to be the lesser of the two evils: too many
assets versus too few assets.
In addition to the interest rate assumption and the number of
plan participants, the composition of the work force can also con-
tribute to the existence of excess plan assets. 9 If the work force
is growing and young, contributions will build up more rapidly
than benefits because retirement benefits are being paid less fre-
quently than contributions are being made. If the group is older the
reverse is true. Since the economy has generally been expanding,
and the work force has been working longer, and remaining health-
ier, many defined benefit plans have had favorable plan experience;
this is reflected in the greater numbers, of better funded or
"overfunded" defined benefit plans. In contrast, those sectors of the
economy that have been less fortunate, such as the steel industry,
have experienced declines in the funded ratios of their pension
plans;9" consequently, they are less able today to meet the in-
creased funding liabilities of their aging population than they were
have sufficient assets on hand when Mr. Mirza retired 12 years later, his use of a 5%
interest rate assumption was reasonable considering the historical investment experience of
other plans. Id. at 923.
87. For discussion on the appropriateness of small defined benefit plans, see Norman
Stein, Some Policy Implications of the IRS' Small Defined Benefit Plan Audit Program, 55
TAX NoTs 1407, 1408-09 (1992).
88. See McGiL & GRUBBS, supra note 19, at 365-66 (discussing the valuation of
small plans).
89. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 34, at 228 (discussing the impact of work
force composition on plan valuation).
90. See PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION, PROMISES AT RISK: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ON SINGLE-EMPLOYEE TERMINATION INSURANCE PREMIUMS 36 (1987)
(explaining the involuntary termination of LTV's Republic Steel pension plan due to its
failure to meet funding requirements).
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in the past. Considering the goal of the preferential tax treatment
of pension plans, it would be far better policy to permit plans to
accelerate funding during thriving times than to defer these greater.
percentages of funding to future years when money may or may
not be available.9
Therefore, before reaching the conclusion that accelerated
funding undermines pension policy, it is necessary to identify the
motivations for overfunding. In some situations overfunding is a
reasonable response to legitimate security concerns.92 In other cir-
cumstances it is an unavoidable result of the principles of actuarial
science.' In any case, neither a preoccupation with the inexact-
ness of actuarial science nor the possibility of asset reversions
should be allowed to taint the perception of advanced funding
methods or minimize the financial security these methods can pro-
vide.'
C. The Occurrence of Asset Reversions on Termination
Notwithstanding the intense debate over the subject of asset
reversion, the actual incidence of asset recovery is relatively
small.95 Reports by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC) show that in 1985, when asset reversions peaked, employ-
ers recovered only $6 billion of a total of approximately $14 bil-
lion potentially recoverable assets.16 Since that time, the occur-
rence of reversions has steadily declined.' In 1987, there were
only 270 terminations with asset reversions in excess of 1 million
dollars as compared to 582 terminations in 1985.9"
Seemingly, there is also a misconception about the relationship
91. The current liability concept, as distinguished from accrued liability, limits the
employer's ability to fund for expected cost of living adjustments (COLA's) and increases
in benefit limitations. This funding limitation shifts a greater portion of funding to a later
time. See I.R.C. § 412(c)(7) (1988) (defining current liability to exclude unpredictable,
contingent events).
92. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 53 and 81 and accompanying text.
94. See infra part I (discussing overfunding in general).
95. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 34, at 649 (citing statistics on plan termina-
tions).
96. PENSION BENEFrr GUARANTY CORPORArION, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS,
FISCAL YEAR 1988, at 10 [hereinafter PBGC ANNUAL REPORT]. For terminations by plan
years, see also OFFICE OF PENStON & WELFARE BENEFrrs PROGRAM, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, THE HANDBOOK OF PENSION STATISTICS 1985, at 311 (Richard A. Ippolito &
Walter Kolodrubetz, eds., 1986) [hereinafter PENSION STATISTICS].
97. PBGC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 96, at 10.
98. EBRI IssUE BRIEF, supra note 14, at 10.
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between overfunding and voluntary terminations. Of the 5% to
10% PBGC-insured defined benefit plans that annually terminate,
apparently only a small number of employers terminate their
overfunded defined benefit plans in order to recover the excess
assets." Many more terminations result from mergers and acqui-
sitions where the acquiring company seeks to simplify its benefit
structure by having one retirement plan."° Other plan termina-
tions occur in response to changes in the employees' preferences;
termination permits the employer to establish a different type of
plan more suited to the employees' choice.' Financial hardship
is also responsible for many terminations.0 2
These facts and figures suggest that the availability of recover-
able assets is not a strong temptation for employers to terminate
their pension plans and that, more often than not, terminations
occur as a result of ordinary business concerns rather than the
employer's desire to recover the excess assets. Consequently, the
concepts of overfunding and reversions are separate and distinct
and should be viewed as such. The conclusion that all excess as-
sets will inevitably revert to the employer on plan termination falls
to acknowledge that plan termination is not directly linked to
overfunding and that motives for accelerating funding are var-
ied. t03 Premised on the recognition that overfunding and asset re-
version are not necessarily related, the next section of this Article
explores alternative approaches to the reversion problem, all of
which shift the emphasis from the funding of ongoing plans to the
recovery of tax gains on plan termination.
II. RESTRICTING ASSET RECOVERY WITHOUT
DISCOURAGING ACCELERATED FUNDING
As discussed in the first part of this Article, accelerated fund-
ing is considered harmful because it is believed to create an incen-
tive for employers to terminate their pension plans in order to
recapture surplus assets. Plan participants may have accepted lower
wages and saved less in reliance on their expected retirement bene-
99. See MCGiLL & GRuBBS, supra note 19, at 5-8.
100. VEAL & MACKIEWICZ, supra note 57, § 1.3.1.
101: Id. § 1.3.4 (describing the increased desires of employees for the termination of
plans and for more individual choice).
102. Id. § 1.3.2.
103. See infra part II (discussing how to restrict asset recovery without discouraging
accelerated funding).
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fits, so that plan termination arguably leaves employees worse off
than had there been no plan at all or had the plan been less gener-
ously funded. 4 Moreover, the recovery of excess plan assets en-
ables the employer to enjoy accelerated deductions and obtain tax-
subsidized gains attributable to the tax-free build-up of investment
earnings over the life of the plan."5 For these reasons, some
policymakers view asset reversions as inconsistent with public
policy and accordingly believe that they should be prohibited,
discouraged, or at least more closely regulated.'" Other
policymakers see asset reversions as a necessary condition of pen-
sion planning.t The latter group contends that severe restrictions
on or prohibitions against asset reversions may discourage employ-
ers from establishing and maintaining defined benefit plans.'
The pension law has responded to the concerns of these op-
posing views by permitting reversions but imposing excise taxes on
recovered amounts."° Policymakers recently sought to further re-
duce the incidence of reversions by discouraging the accumulation
of excess contributions in ongoing plans by imposing an additional
excise tax on nondeductible contributions." The combination of
these tactics has substantially curbed the number of asset rever-
sions.' Despite the effectiveness of these measures, this ap-
proach fails to utilize the most direct method of regulating asset
reversions, since it not only reduces the incidence of asset recovery
but also that of accelerated funding as well."' Part II of this Ar-
104. See Daniel L Halperin, Tax Policy and Retirement Income: A Rational Model for
the 21st Century, in SEARCH FOR A NATIONAL RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY 188-89 (Jack
L. VanDerhei ed., 1987).
105. See discussion infra part II (discussing reasons for overfunding, including tax
benefits).
106. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 9, at 20 (statement of Senator Metzenbaum).
107. See id. at 118 (statement of David M. Walker, Aging Executive Director, PBGC).
108. See i&L
109. ERISA, § 4044(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(d)(1) (1988), provides for distributing to
the employer residual assets once all liabilities of the plan have been satisfied. I.R.C. §
4980 was enacted in 1986 and provided for a 10% excise tax on reversions. Tax Reform
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1132, 100 Stat. 2085, 2478-79. In 1988, it was
amended to increase the tax to 15%. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6069, 102 Stat. 3342, 3702. The Revenue Act of 1990 amended
I.R.C. § 4980(a) to increase the excise tax on reversions to 20% in general, and to 50%
if no replacement plan exists. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-508, §§ 12001-02, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-562 (1987).
110. See I.R.C. § 4972(a) (1988); see also supra notes 59, 96-97 and accompanying
text (discussing the new excise tax and the decrease in reversions and terminations).
111. See supra notes 96-97 .and accompanying text (citing statistics of reduced rever-
sions).
112. See discussion infra part 11.B for a discussion of more direct methods of asset
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ticle addresses the question of whether asset reversions can be pre-
vented or deterred by methods which do not preclude accelerated
funding.
A. Reversion Requirements
While proposals have been made to allow withdrawals of
surplus assets from ongoing plans,' plan termination is presently
a prerequisite for the recovery of surplus assets."4 This makes it
possible to regulate asset recovery on plan termination. Such an
approach appropriately shifts the emphasis from overfunding to
recapturing tax gains associated with recovered amounts. Prior to
exploring possible alternatives to current reversion law, however, it
is necessary to review the controversy surrounding the concept of
asset reversions in order to better understand why the subject com-
mands so much attention from policymakers. Even today, with
forceful deterrents to overfunding and asset reversion in place, the
subject continues to be highly controversial."5
Employers are permitted to recover excess assets only when
the plan document explicitly provides for reversions and the rever-
sions do not violate any provision of the law."6 Additionally, for
tax qualification under Internal Revenue Code section 401(a), plans
are required to provide that in the event of plan termination the ac-
crued benefits of all affected employees must be nonforfeitable to
the extent that they are funded at the date of termination."' For
example, if an employee is only 20% vested in her accrued benefit,
she would normally be entitled to only 20% of her accrued benefit;
recovery.
113. See Jeannie L. Pilant & James T. Tilton, The Pension Reversion Controversy and
the 'Buck Letter': Another Round, 26 TAX NOTES 1147 (1985) (arguing in favor of the
Buck Letter which was an advisory letter from the IRS concluding that surplus assets
from defined benefit plan would be transferred to a profit sharing plan). The Buck Letter
has been withdrawn by the IRS. VEAL & MACKMWICZ, supra note 57, § 12.7.
114. ERISA, § 403(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1992). Amounts contributed
by mistake can be recovered by an employer within a specified period from an ongoing
plan. ERISA, § 403(c)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)(A) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
115. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 34, at 661-64 (discussing competing argu-
ments).
116. 29 U.S.C. §- 1344(d)(1) (1988). Even when the employer reserves the right to
terminate the plan, the abandonment of a plan within a few years after its establishment
is evidence that the plan was never a bona fide program for the exclusive benefit of plan
participants and thus, violates the exclusive benefit rule. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(b)(2) (as
amended in 1976). Therefore, all tax benefits are lost.
117. I.R.C. § 411(d)(3) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) denies tax qualification under § 401(a)
unless a plan provides for 100% vesting of all accrued benefits on plan termination.
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however, on plan termination, she becomes entitled to 100% of her
accrued benefit.
Notwithstanding these requirements, some pension experts
continue to believe that plan participants are adversely affected by
plan termination because of the lost opportunity for future accruals
under the plan."' Further, unlike annual contributions, termination
benefits are based on current salaries rather than higher, projected
salaries. Consequently, a participant's retirement benefit will gen-
erally be less than it would have been had the plan not terminat-
ed. 119
The Select Committee on Aging and the Subcommittee on
Labor-Management Relations of the Committee on Education and
Labor of the U.S. House of Representatives prepared a 1985 report
which described a situation in which a participant's retirement
benefit was substantially reduced as a result of plan termina-
tion. '" The report describes how without prior notice the
participant's plan filed to terminate and recapture 10 million dollars
in excess plan assets. The participant had expected to work until
age 65, at which time he would have received a pension benefit of
$800 dollars a month for life. However, on plan termination his ac-
cruals ceased, and the benefit was cashed out at $35,000, the ac-
tuarial equivalent of a $300 a month life annuity, payable at age
65. Thus, the employee at age 65 will receive $6,000 a year less
in retirement income than he would have had the plan contin-
ued.' To approximate this result, assume that the benefit formu-
la for the plan was 2.5% times years of service times average
compensation for the highest three years. Also assume that the
employee commenced employment at age 48 with a starting salary
of $10,000, that the participant's salary increased at 5% per year,
and that the plan terminated 10 years later. Thus, on plan termina-
tion, the participant's salary was $16,300, and the accrued benefit
under the plan was $3,882 per year, or approximately $324 per
month payable at age 65. Had the plan not terminated, however,
the accrued benefit at -age 65 would have been $9,285, or approxi-
mately $774 per month payable at age 65." Thus, there is a
118. See, e.g., Richard A. Ippolito, Issues Surrounding Pension Terminations for Rever-
sion, 5 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 81, 83-87 (1986) (arguing that the termination of a plan can
harm workers).
119. See Halperin, supra note 104, at 188-90.
120. See Hearings, supra note 9, at 26.
121. See id. at 39.
122. Assuming a 5% salary scale increase, an employee earning $10,000 would earn
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benefit loss of $450 per month or $5,400 per year.
The disparity represents the difference in the benefit accrual
for ten years of service at the higher projected salary of $21,846
and the benefit accrual for ten years at the lower salary of $15,526
and shows how much of the benefit reduction is attributable to the
loss of future salary increases. Therefore, the participant will re-
ceive $1,518 per year, or $150 per month, less because the project-
ed salary increases will not occur after the plan terminates. Similar-
ly, comparing the benefit accrual for seventeen years using the
projected salary of $21,846 to the benefit accrual using the same
salary at ten years shows how much of the benefit reduction is at-
tributable to the loss of future years of service. The retirement
benefit is $3,823 per year, or $319 per month, 23 less because the
participants credited service will never be greater than ten years
after the plan terminates. 24
Because the difference can be so substantial, policymakers
opposed to permitting excess assets to revert to the employer on
plan termination view reversions as bad public policy and find the
practice inconsistent with pension policy and the specific goals of
ERISA. These critics bolster their position by asserting that the
participants have bargained for and relied upon their retirement
benefits in various ways."
Participants' rights advocates further argue that employee
benefits represent a substantial part of compensation. Since employ-
ees have accepted lower wages in exchange for their pension bene-
$16,300 after 10 years (1.05 to the tenth power times $10,000). Averaging compensation
from the eighth (1.05 to the eighth x $10,000 = $14,775), the ninth (1.05 to the ninth
power x $10,000 = $15,513), and the tenth year (1.05 to the tenth power x $10,000 =
$16,289), a benefit accrual formula of 2.5% x years of service times average compensa-
tion for the highest three years would be $15,526 and produce an accrued benefit of
$3,882 per year or approximately $324 per month (.025 x 10 x $15,526 = $3,882). Had
the plan not terminated, the participant's accrued benefit would have been based on 17
years of service (65 - 48 = 17). The average compensation from the highest three years
would have been $21,846 ($20,789 + $21,829 + $22,920 divided by 3). The accrued
benefit would have been based on compensation from year fifteen, sixteen, and seventeen
producing $9,285 per year or $774 per month (.025 x 17 x $21,846 = $9,285).
123. The difference between $9285 (.025 x 17 x 21,846) and $5462 (.025 x 10 x 21,
846) per year and between $774 (9285 [divided by] 12) and $455 (5462 [divided by] 12)
per month.
124. These two components total a $5,403 differential. Rounding accounts for the dis-
crepancy in this figure and the approximate $6,000 annual reduction referred to on the
previous pages of this discussion.
125. See Ippolito, supra note 118, at 83-87.
[Vol. 44:1
DEFINED BENEFIT PLAN FUNDING
fits.'26 Accordingly, these advocates believe that the participants
are entitled to the surplus assets on plan termination, at least to the
extent that the participants have funded the excess assets with
reduced wages.
There are various theories which explain how lowered wages
fund the cost of plan benefits." One view is that plan partici-
pants have given up wages equal to the value of the benefits which
they accrue each year. 9 Thus, the participants' annual wages are
implicitly reduced by the present value of each year's pension
accrual.' To illustrate, assume that a plan provides a normal re-
tirement benefit of $10 per month per year of service payable at
age 65.13 At the end of one year, an employee who is 30 years
old would have earned a pension benefit of $10 per month, pay-
able at age 65. Assume also that this benefit has a present value of
$80. The participant's current salary under this theory would have
been reduced by $80 in the first year for the first year's pension
accrual.'32
Other theorists explain that the reduction in participant wages
equals the level payment needed to fund the projected benefit.' 3
Under this view, current wages are reduced by the level amount
necessary to fund the amortization of the participant's expected
benefit. For example, in the illustration above, the participant's pro-
jected monthly benefit based upon 35 years of service is $350, and
the first year's amortization of this benefit is about $315. As a
result, the employee's wages would have been reduced by $315
annually.' Consequently, after one year, on plan termination te
employee should be entitled to a benefit'35 almost four times
greater than the $10 per month benefit accrued under the plan.136
126. See id. at 97-98.
127. Id. at 105, 109 (stating that if plan termination is the breaking of an implied con-
tract between the firm and workers, arguably the reversion belongs to the workers and a
legal mechanism should be created so plans can be made irrevocable trusts).
128. See VEAL & MACKIEwIcZ, supra note 57, § 12.1.1, at 204-05 (summarizing sev-
eral theories of how lowered wages fund benefit plans).
129. Id. at 205.
130. Under this theory, wage reductions would increase as employees grew older.
131. This example is taken from VEAL & MACKIEWICZ, supra note 57, § 12.1.1, at
204.
132. Id. at 205.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. The employee would be entitled to $315 adjusted for one year's interest.
136. See generally RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, PENSIONS, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1986) (comparing the benefits an employee expects from a pension plan to the benefit he
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Another reason some see asset reversion as bad pension policy
is that not only are wages driven down in exchange for the pen-
sion plan, but personal savings suffer from reliance on the expected
benefits. Plan participants rely on the permanence of the plan, the
financial security of the plan, and the promised benefits of the
plan. As a result, their savings are not as much as they would
have been without the expectation that the plan would provide for
them in their retirement. 37 Thus, on plan termination employees
do not get the retirement benefits for which they have paid, nor
the ones upon which they have reasonably relied.
Plan termination causes less damage when an employer estab-
lishes a new plan, called a replacement plan, that covers the same
participants.' However, the participants may still suffer because,
if there is a reversion, the newly established plan will have fewer
assets. This resolution in assets raises a number of concerns. First,
participants could have less protection against bad investments and
other financial uncertainties. 39  Second, the replacement plan is
more likely to terminate involuntarily due to insufficient plan as-
sets. Finally, the new plan is less likely to grant the ad hoc in-
creases typically"' given to offset the effects of inflation.4
In situations where the replacement plan is a defined contribu-
tion plan rather than another defined benefit plan,'42 older em-
ployees may suffer an even greater loss. While having defined
contribution plan coverage over one's working life can be as good
will receive if the plan terminates).
137. Id. at 10-11 (stating that workers do replace a part of their savings outside a pen-
sion with pension savings).
138. For a description of replacement plans, see McGiLL & GRUBBS, supra note 19, at
580 (discussing "Reestablishment Terminations").
139. The replacement plan would, of course, still have to satisfy the minimum funding
standard and the prohibition against the reduction of accrued benefits to qualify for the
tax benefits afforded under ERISA. See supra text accompanying notes 3-6 (summarizing
qualification requirements and tax benefits under ERISA).
140. For detailed discussion of the frequency and rate at which post retirement adjust-
ments are made, see supra note 77, 177-79.
141. A few plans have automatic cost of living adjustments in their benefit formulas.
The court in Shaw v. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers Pension
Plan, 563 F. Supp. 653 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aft'd, 750 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1985), concluded
that where there is such a provision, the right to future adjustments comprises part of the
participant's accrued benefit. Id. at 657. Thus, plan participants were entitled to cost of
living adjustments. Id at 659. In the absence of such provision, the employer will often
voluntarily amend the plan in order to, provide the ad hoc increases. However, on plan
termination these adjustments are not considered part of the accrued benefit.
142. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (explaining the difference between
the defined benefit plan and the defined contribution plan).
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as having defined benefit plan coverage,'43 having the defined
benefit plan early in one's working life and the defined contribu-
tion plan later is probably the worst of both worlds. This can be
seen by comparing the two types of plans.
A defined benefit plan and a defined contribution plan which
anticipate the same investment return and share the same goals of
replacing income upon retirement would call for equal contribu-
tions'" spread over the employee's lifetime.45 On plan termina-
tion, however, the plans produce vastly different accrued bene-
fits.'46 In a defined benefit plan, the amount accumulated from
expected salary increases and cost of living adjustments is general-
ly not considered part of the accrued benefit and, therefore, would
revert to the employer on plan termination.47 In contrast, in a de-
fined contribution plan, these amounts are part of the account bal-
ance and are distributed to the participants. Therefore, on plan
termination, most participants in a defined benefit plan would expe-
rience a reduction in their expected benefit 4 and would be en-
titled to a smaller amount than that provided under a defined con-
tribution plan with similar goals for retirement income. 49
The defined benefit/defined contribution plan combination is
undesirable for some plan participants because the benefits of em-
ployees closer to retirement in a defined benefit plan have greater
funding costs given that there is less time for the contribution to
build-up; therefore, the employer must make greater contributions
on behalf of older participants. However, in a defined contribution
plan, contributions are made to individual accounts and ordinarily
reflect a given percentage of compensation regardless of age; there-
fore, no mechanism exists to make up for the accrued benefits
143. See Halperin, supra note 104, at 184 (stating that there is a parallel between de-
fined benefit plans and defined contribution plans only if the contribution plan is a "target
benefit" plan); MCGL & GRUBBS, supra note 19, at 115-16 (defining target benefit
plans); infra note 148.
144. See Halperin, supra note 104, at 184-86.
145. See infra notes 152-55 and accompanying text (discussing risk factors associated
with each type plan).
146. On plan termination, the accrued benefits in defined benefit plans are based on
current salary; in ongoing plans, funding is based on projected salary which includes cost
of living adjustments and salary increases. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text (describing impact of termination
on benefits).
148. See Halperin, supra note 104, at 185 (describing the disadvantages of defined
benefit plans upon termination for longer term employees).
149. Fully accrued retirement benefits would not be affected.
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which would have resulted from future accruals under the defined
benefit plan. This situation renders a replacement plan of the de-
fined contribution type largely ineffective in its ability to meet the
employee's original expectations.15 °
Subject to statutory limitation, defined benefit plans may pro-
vide greater accruals for later years of service.' This practice,
known as backloading, effectively gives older participants larger
accruals. For example, a benefit formula may provide 1.75% of
compensation for the first 15 years and 2.0% for the remaining
years. Thus, in addition to the loss of future accruals and salary
increases, the older participant may lose the backloaded portion of
her accruals when a defined benefit plan is replaced by a defined
contribution plan.
A further reason why older plan participants may experience a
greater loss when their defined benefit plan is replaced with a
defined contribution plan is the shift in investment risk that accom-
panies the change in plan type. 52 In a defined contribution plan,
150. See Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance
Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 795, 849 (1993) (stating that an individual covered by
a defined benefit plan loses pensions benefits by leaving her current employer due to the
way pension benefits are calculated under defined benefit plans). Similarly, an employee
remaining with an employer who replaces a defined benefit plan with a defined contri-
bution plan would suffer similar results. Romano states that another disadvantage to de-
fined contribution plans is that the employee bears the risk of having insufficient retire-
ment income. Id. While not focusing on the perspective of the older worker, Romano
concludes that the advantages of defined contribution plans outweigh their disadvantages.
Id. at 850.
151. I.R.C. § 411(b) provides three alternative methods for determining accrued benefits.
I.R.C. § 411(b)(l)-(3) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Subsection (1), the 3% rule, provides that
at least 3% of the projected retirement benefit must accrue each year; subsection (2), the
133 1/3% rule, provides that no benefit accrual rate may vary more than 133 1/3% from
the preceding year's rate, and subsection (3), the fractional rule, provides that the benefit
accruing in any one year be prorated with respect to the number of years to normal
retirement. Id. However, a plan may use any formula for computing accrued benefits as
long as the accrued benefit is not less than one of the three methods prescribed in the
Code. The purpose of the benefit accrual requirements is to prevent excessive backloading
of accrued benefits in defined benefit plans, a practice which can be used to evade vest-
ing requirements.
152. In a defined benefit plan where the assets are pooled in one trust and a fixed
benefit is promised to plan participants on retirement, independent of investment perfor-
mance, it is the employer who bears the investment risk. George B. Swick, Pension In-
dustry: What Role?, in SEARCH FOR A NATIONAL RETIREmENT INcoME POLICY 123, 142-
44 (Jack L. VanDerhei ed., 1987) (listing the pros and cons of defined benefit and de-
fined contribution plans from both employee and employer perspectives). For example, if
investment performance is less than expected, the employer increases contributions. Thus,
the defined benefit plan provides greater security and predictability to the employees. In a
defined contribution plan where the employer makes annual contributions into the individ-
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the employer sets up individual accounts for each participant and
contributes a predetermined amount to each account, usually with-
out regard to age or service.' The assets are invested, and at
retirement the entire balance of the account is paid to the partici-
pant. Thus, it is the employee in the defined contribution arrange-
ment who bears the investment risk. Only younger employees will
have sufficient remaining service to hold their investments for
longer periods of time enabling them to take advantage of more
risky vehicles which historically have better performance over the
long run. 5" Their accounts, having more time to absorb market
risk, will experience greater investment yield. Older participants,
however, are compelled to invest conservatively because they are
approaching retirement and cannot afford to choose the riskier, but
more lucrative, investment instruments." 5 Therefore, on plan ter-
mination, older participants may experience a greater reduction in
their defined benefit plan benefit and will enjoy smaller accumula-
tion under the replacement defined contribution plan than younger
participants similarly situated.
Despite the various forms of hardship that employees may
experience as a result of plan termination, those who advocate
permitting reversions view proposed laws in favor of participant's
rights as inequitable.'56 They maintain that these laws are unfair
to the employer because the employer must make up the difference
when plan projections underestimate actual cost but cannot benefit
when actuarial estimates exceed actual plan experience.'57 They
ual accounts of plan participants and the entire balance of the account is distributed to
the participant at retirement, it is the employee who bears the investment risk. l. If
investment performance falls short in a defined contribution plan, the benefit falls below
expectations.
153. The "target-benefit plan" is a type of defined contribution plan that contains a
defined benefit formula, but the benefit stated in the formula is merely an assumed ben-
efit. McGILL & GRUBBS, supra note 19, at I15-16 (defining target benefit plans). The
amount of the annual contribution is determined by an actuarial factor that varies by age;
however, once the amount of the contribution is established, the contribution becomes the
important factor and the stated benefit is ignored. Thus, favorable investment performance
is still essential in determining the amount of benefits payable under this type of plan.
See id at 126.
154. For discussion of the investment characteristics of pension plans, see id. at 449-58.
155. Douglas A. Love, ERISA: The Law Versus Economics, 25 GA. L. REv. 135, 141
(1990).
156. See VEAL & MACKIEWICZ, supra note 57, at 202-06 (arguing against critics of
reversions on equitable grounds).
157. The employer generally benefits from favorable plan experience in an ongoing
defined benefit plan because the minimum contribution requirement for the next plan year
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contend that under these conditions, employers will be unwilling to
assume the additional risks and administrative burdens of estab-
lishing and maintaining defined benefit plans.'58 It is not surpris-
ing that these critics view the "wrong" resolution of the reversion
controversy as a potential threat to defined benefit pension plans.
Regardless of whether one believes asset reversions undermine
the tax incentives designed to encourage employers to maintain
pension plans or that asset reversions are the entitlement of em-
ployers who assume the additional responsibility of maintaining
defined benefit plans, the voluntary nature of establishing private
pension plans makes it necessary for policymakers to find a middle
ground and enact laws which respond to the concerns of employees
and employers alike. Moreover, because it is unlikely that either
side will ever persuade the other, policymakers must continue to
look for a compromise which not only makes each group happy in
the short run, but also promotes good pension policy over the long
run.
As noted, prior to 1990, the law permitted reversions of
amounts in excess of the funds needed to cover the plan's accrued
liabilities, but imposed a 15% excise tax"59 on the recovered
amounts. The effectiveness of this compromise depends on the
specific goals of policymakers as well as their views on the rela-
tive importance of competing interests. In some situations the ex-
cise tax on recovered assets was not sufficient to offset the tax
advantages associated with recovered amounts,"W thus, the em-
ployer received a windfall on plan termination. In other situations,
is reduced by the experience gain. See McGILu & GRUBBS, supra note 19, at 449 (de-
scribing investment characteristics of defined benefit plans). This result occurs only in
ongoing defined benefit plans since the employer usually would not make any subsequent
contributions to a terminating plan.
158. Defined benefit plans are administratively more difficult to maintain because they
rely on actuarial calculations. Although defined benefit plans offer an employer flexibility
in the funding of a plan, the employer assumes the investment risk of the plan assets.
See Swick, supra note 152. Additionally, in a defined benefit plan, the employer must
pay an annual premium to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). See
MCGILL & GRUBBS, supra note 19, at 124 (detailing advantages and disadvantages of
plan approaches).
159. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
160. See General Accounting Office, Pension Plan Terminations: Effectiveness of Excise
Tax in Recovering Tax Benefits in Asset Reversions (July 1990) (Report to the Chairman,
Subcomm. on Oversight, House Comm. on Ways and Means) [hereinafter GAO Report]
(not addressing policy objectives seeking to prohibit or restrict asset reversions, but exam-
ining the effectiveness of the current excise tax and concluding that the excise tax failed
to recapture tax benefits from asset reversions).
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the excise tax approximated the gain resulting from the tax favor-
able treatment of the excess in the plan; as a result, the employer
was presumably no better or worse off than had the amounts which
led to the excess assets never been contributed to the plan. In yet
other situations, the excise tax exceeded the tax savings attributable
to the recovered assets; consequently, to the extent that an employ-
er could anticipate this possibility, the excise tax served as a deter-
rent from deliberately overfunding in order to ultimately recover
the excess assets on plan termination.
In no situation, however, did the flat 15% excise tax directly
provide additional protection for plan participants. t6' Thus, to the
extent that participants' rights advocates sought not only to elimi-
nate the employer's windfall but to provide more protection for
plan participants, the reversion laws prior to 1990 were insufficient.
On the other hand, to the extent that the excise tax deterred em-
ployers from recapturing excess plan assets, the employers' rights
advocates believed that the recovery restrictions were unfairly im-
posed on plan sponsors.
B. Alternative Solutions
New legislation aimed at regulating the employer's ability to
recover surplus assets on plan termination could more directly
address asset recovery without discouraging overfunding" The
passage of laws that: (1) limit the recovery of assets to certain
amounts or (2) restructure the excise tax on recovered assets to
recapture tax gains attributable to those amounts would achieve this
goal by making surplus assets less accessible and reversions less
attractive on plan termination. The degree to which these proposals
161. The excise tax on reverted amounts may have deterred some employers from re-
capturing surplus assets; however, the GAO Report indicates that in most cases the 15%
excise tax rate was insufficient to recapture the tax benefits associated with the recovered
surplus. GAO Report, supra note 160, at 4. It was inadequate as a deterrent for employ-
ers who overfunded their plans with the intention of recovering them later on plan termi-
nation. Moreover, employers were economically better off after the reversion than had the
excess funds never been contributed to the plan.
162. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1131(c)(1), 100 Stat. 2085
(1986). This legislation, which proposes to control reversions by eliminating ovrfunding,
employs an indirect approach to resolving the reversion problem. In response to the con-
tinuing reversion controversy, effective January 1, 1987, Congress imposed a new excise
tax on surplus amounts in ongoing plans. By decreasing the assets available for recovery,
the number of reversions automatically decreased. Under this law, excess contributions are
nondeductible and subject to a 10% excise tax for as long as the plan's assets exceed the
plan's liabilities.
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are applied would indicate whether these solutions were being used
to recapture tax gains, to protect the interests of plan participants,
or to deter the incidence of asset reversions.
1. Limiting the Amount of Assets Recoverable
on Plan Termination
While current law attempts to balance the interests of employ-
ers and employees, pre-ERISA laws were less responsive to the
employees' interests and overwhelmingly favorable to the
employer's, interests under state trust laws. 63 In some instances,
reversions were allowed even in cases where the plan contained no
express language giving the employer the right to excess assets."6
Some of these cases received Congressional attention with plan
participants appearing as witnesses at two pension reform hear-
ings."' As a result of this deference to employers, the initial
drafts of ERISA contained provisions prohibiting the reversion of
plan assets to employers from plans that terminated without gov-
ernment approval."e Eventually, however, these provisions were
eliminated, and the final drafts explicitly authorized employers who
reserved reversion rights in their plan documents to recover the
remaining assets. 67 The recovery was subject to the satisfaction
of all liabilities and to the limitations outlined in section 4044(d)
of the Internal Revenue Code which guaranteed employees a por-
tion of the return on their contributions. 68
The principal statutory limitation on reversions is currently
found in section 401(a)(2) of the Code. This section provides that
163. VEAL & MACKmEWIcZ, supra note 57, § 12.2.
164. See, e.g., Lynch v. Dawson Collieries, Inc., 485 S.W.2d 494, 495 (Ky. 1972)
(awarding excess to company because express language regarding "erroneous actuarial
calculations" simply meant a variance between actual plan experience and its reasonably
anticipated experience).
165. During the formative stages of ERISA, a dispute arose between the Elgin Watch
Company and its employees regarding title to residual assets and raised new concerns
regarding the issue of reversions. The Elgin Watch Company established a defined benefit
plan that was jointly funded by both the employer and the employees. In 1958, the com-
pany determined that the plan was overfunded and discontinued making its contributions.
The employees continued making their contributions until 1973 when the plan terminated
with a surplus of 12 million dollars which the employer claimed. Plan participants sued
for the right to the excess funds arguing that they, rather than the employer, were entitled
to the surplus amounts. See generally Hearings, supra note 9, at 96-97 (statement of
Michael S. Gordon) (describing the background of the Elgin Watch Company dispute).




DEFINED BENEFIT PLAN FUNDING
a reversion of excess assets is prohibited until all liabilities to
participants and their beneficiaries are satisfied. Section 1.401-2(b)
of the regulations interprets section 401(a)(2) and is based on ex-
plicit language from its legislative history It provides that the
employer is permitted to recover on plan termination any balance
that is due to "erroneous actuarial computation."'169
The Internal Revenue Service interprets the term "erroneous
actuarial computation" very broadly 170 It effectively characterizes
all assets in excess of the plan's liabilities as "erroneous actuarial
computation." However, it is possible for the Internal Revenue
Service to be more restrictive in its interpretation of "erroneous
actuarial computation" and find that some excesses are not due to
actuarial error. The narrower interpretation would prevent the em-
ployer from recovering these excesses on plan termination.
Under the narrower interpretation, erroneous actuarial computa-
tion can be described as the difference between actuarial predic-
tions and actual experience. When a plan has favorable plan expe-
nence as, for example, higher investment returns or greater
nonvested turnover, the actuarial error produces an actuarial gain.
Similarly, when a plan has unfavorable experience, the actuarial
error produces an actuarial loss. In contrast, excesses that occur as
a result of plan termination are distinguishable and are not the
result of the difference in actuarial estimates and actual plan expe-
rience. These excesses represent the difference in the calculation of
ongoing plan liabilities and those at termination. 7' As noted earli-
er, a plan's ongoing liabilities are based on projected salary in-
169. See Norman P. Stein, Reversions From Pension Plans: History, Policies, and Pros-
pects, 44 TAX L. REv. 259, 284 (1989) (criticizing pension reversions from the perspec-
tive of tax policy issues).
170. See Rev. Rul. 83-52, 1983-1 C.B. 87 (deterrmning the amount that may be re-
turned to an employer upon the termination of a defined benefit plan in accordance with
the nondiversion requirement of I.R.C. § 401(a)(2)).
171. For example, assume a trust has accumulated assets of $1,500,000 at the time of
termination at which time it is determined that $1,450,000 will satisfy all of the liabilities
under the plan. Further assume that the surplus of $50,000 arose because non-vested turn-
over brought about fewer actual forfeitures than expected. This $50,000 is therefore the
amount the employer may recover as the result of an erroneous actuarial computation. If,
however, the surplus of $50,000 had been accumulated as the result of a change in the
benefit provisions or in the eligibility requirements of the plan, the $50,000 could not
revert to the employer because it is not the result of an erroneous actuarial calculation.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.401-2(b) (1980). By analogy, excesses which result from the
employer's decision to change from a permanent saving arrangement for its employees to
a terminated one are thus distinguishable and are not attributable to erroneous actuarial
calculation.
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creases; liabilities at plan termination are based on current
salaries.12
The regulations, in fact, suggest that any unintended excess
from conservative actuarial predictions is an actuarial error and
belongs to the employer on plan termination, whereas any unin-
tended excess that arises on plan termination from the use of pro-
jected cost methods is not actuarial error and belongs to the plan
participant.'73 This distinction is supported by the fact that the
plan's actuary has no discretion to fund for termination. Rather, the
underlying basis of an actuarial cost projection is the assumption
that the plan is a permanent arrangement and that the plan benefits
will never be eliminated or reduced for any reason. The plan's cost
is not reduced for the possibility that the plan will prematurely
terminate. Wages are reduced in amounts which reflect the perma-
nence of the plan. Therefore, excess assets arising on plan termina-
tion result from the employer's miscalculation of the permanence
of the plan, not from the actuary's erroneous computation.74
The regulations appear to distinguish excesses attributable to
favorable plan experience from excesses attributable to the use of
projected cost funding methods."75 However, in a set of 1984
guidelines on asset recoveries, the Internal Revenue Service an-
nounced an interpretation of the regulation that effectively rejected
the actuarial error limitation. Revenue Ruling 83-52 articulated the
position that an employer could recover all plan assets in excess of
the value of accrued benefits at the time of termination.'76 The
Service, thus, adopted the view that all assets remaining in a plan
after all liabilities had been satisfied were to be treated for pur-
poses of the statute as if they occurred due to actuarial error."7
At the time, the Service could not have anticipated the poten-
tial magnitude of the resulting reversion problem. Perhaps, the
administrative ease of this interpretation persuaded the Service to
adopt this position, or the Service relied on the argument that
172. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
173. The regulation explicitly indicates that gains resulting from a change in the benefit
structure of the plan or a change in the eligibility requirements could not revert to the
employer because such surplus would not be the result of an erroneous actuarial computa-
tion. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-2(b)(1) (1980).
174. See Stein, supra note 169, at 282-84 (describing that surplus assets due to some
types of employer action do not result from actuarial error).
175. Treas. Reg. § 1.401-(2)(b)(1) (1980).
176. Rev. Rul. 83-52, 1983-1 C.B. 87.
177. Stein, supra note 169, at 282-83.
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restricting the employer's ability to recapture excess plan assets
could adversely affect the establishment of defined benefit pension
plans. Despite the possible rationales, permitting asset reversions on
plan termination without regard to the source of the excess assets
enabled employers to recover significant amounts of assets that
were not the result of erroneous actuarial calculations.'78
Reversion policy would not be as liberal if the Service en-
forced the regulation's actuarial error provision. This limitation
would prevent employers from recovering excess assets not arising
from favorable plan experience. The employer's windfall on plan
termination would decrease to the extent that the surplus was not
recoverable. Moreover, plan participants would benefit from the
non-recoverable portion. For example, it would be possible to
require that the non-recoverable portion of surplus assets be used
to provide pro rata benefit increases to all plan participants. Thus,
retirement benefits would more closely approximate the amount
which the participants paid and which they expected to receive.
The actuarial error limitation appears to be a more equitable
approach than current reversion policy for two reasons. First, it im-
proves the employees' position on plan termination. The employee
no longer loses amounts attributable to projected wage increases
and cost of living adjustments. The actuarial error limitation pro-
hibits these amounts from being recovered by the employer and,
therefore, increases the accrued benefits of plan participants on plan
termination.'79 Second, it reduces the employer's windfall. The
employer is still permitted to recapture excess plan assets but only
to the extent that they are truly attributable to actuarial error. 8 '
An approach that looks to actuarial error is more consistent
with the objectives of ERISA than current law because it limits the
recovery of excess plan assets without discouraging legitimate
accelerated funding, a practice which achieves ERISA's goals of
increasing savings and providing greater security for plan partici-
pants. Moreover, to the extent that such an approach allows the
employer to recover excess assets resulting from actuarial error, it
encourages employers to establish and maintain defined benefit
plans.
178. Il at 262.
179. Il at 273-75.
180. Of course, the amount that the employer ultimately recovers is subject to an excise
tax to adjust for the tax build-up on the excess amounts. A regular tax cannot accomplish
such an adjustment. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 221-23.
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However, enforcement of a true actuarial error limitation on
reversions could have its own problems. Limiting employer recov-
ery to the excess amounts attributable to erroneous actuarial error
may encourage employers to manipulate their plan assumptions. For
example, an employer might use a very low investment yield as-
sumption and a very low salary increase projection. As a result, on
plan termination, a greater portion of the surplus assets can be
attributed to erroneous actuarial calculation rather than to termina-
tion liability. These manipulations enable the employer to recover
more of the surplus. Since the interest rate assumption has a great-
er impact on plan cost than any other assumption, there is room
for substantial funding flexibility under such schemes. 8'
In order to compensate for this weakness, this solution re-
quires greater scrutiny of interest rate assumptions on audits con-
ducted by the Internal Revenue Service and stricter standards for
the reasonableness of actuarial assumptions.'82 The reasonableness
of actuarial assumptions is a contained problem that can more
easily be resolved than the far-reaching difficulties presented by
current recovery practices.
Admittedly, given all the legislation in this area, it may be
difficult, if not impossible, for the Internal Revenue Service to
change its interpretation of the statute. A reinterpretation could
more effectively be accomplished through Congressional action.
The policy of discouraging terminations by limiting the
employer's ability to recover surplus assets on plan termination to
amounts caused by actuarial error is but one way to resolve the
question of who is properly entitled to the surplus assets. Other
proposals regarding asset reversions do not address the asset own-
ership issue at all and focus entirely on reducing the employer's
windfall on plan termination. Such proposals require the use of all
or much of the residual assets on plan termination to increase the
benefits of plan participants regardless of actuarial error."3
181. See STUART G. SCHOENLY, PENSION ToPics 10-11 (1991) (Society of Actuaries
No. 460-24-91).
182. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
183. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 9, at 58 (statement of Donald S. Grubbs, Jr., Con-
sulting Actuary, Buck Consultants, Inc.) (proposing solution that permits employer with-
drawal but limits withdrawal amounts to protect secured benefits).
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2. Increasing Excise Taxes on Asset Reversions
Discouraging reversions without deterring overfunding can be
achieved by increasing the excise tax on all amounts recovered by
plan sponsors on plan termination. This can be accomplished by
increased fixed rates or adjustable rates."8 The primary purpose
of the excise tax on reversions is to recapture the tax-subsidized
gains left unaddressed by a regular income tax. To the extent that
the excise tax exceeds the tax benefits, employers will be reluctant
to recapture excess plan assets on plan termination. More impor-
tantly, they will not likely set out to do so. Thus, unlike the actu-
arial error limitation, higher excise taxes do not directly limit the
employer's ability to recover surplus assets but do so indirectly by
making the recovery more costly and less attractive to employers.
The Tax Reform Act (TRA) of 1986 adopted this indirect
approach and imposed a flat 10% excise tax, later increased to
15%,"5 on all excess amounts recovered by employers from qual-
ified pension plans. 86 However, in a July, 1990 study, the Gener-
al Accounting Office (GAO) reported that the 15% rate was not
sufficient to recapture the tax benefits associated with amounts
recovered on plan termination."' The report concluded that the
excise tax rate would need to be between 17% and 55%, varying
with the facts of the case in order to recapture the value of the
tax-free build-up of recovered amounts. '
184. An increased adjustable, or variable rate schedule could be designed to apply dif-
ferent rates for different circumstances. For example, investment types, period of time over
which the plan was overfunded, and the employer's marginal tax rate could all be used to
determine which of the scheduled rates should apply.
185. I.R.C. § 4980 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
186. There is an exception for amounts that could have been recovered without termina-
tion. For example, in the case of a mistaken calculation, the employer is permitted to
recover contributions made as a result of the miscalculation within a certain period after
the contribution is made if the plan so provides. Id. § 4980(c)(2)(B) (1988); Rev. Rul.
77-200, 1977-2 C.B. 98.
Also, if a contribution is made conditioned on qualification of the plan and the plan
subsequently does not qualify, then the contribution may be returned to the employer
within one year of the denial of qualification. See ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(2)(B)
(1988); Rev. Rul. 60-276, 1960-2 C.B. 150.
187. See GAO Report, supra note 160, at 11.
188. The results from the 55 cases studied indicated that the mean average for the
excise tax rate needed to recover pension tax benefits was about 37% and the median
was about 39%. In 96% of the cases, the appropriate rate equaled or exceeded a 20%
rate, in 75% of the cases the rate equaled or exceeded a 30% excise tax rate, and in
27% of the cases the appropriate rate for recapture equaled or exceeded a 45% rate. Id.
at 4-5.
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The tax-free build-up of plan assets is a function of many
variables. The build-up depends on such factors as the period over
which the overfunding extended, where the excess assets were
invested, and the rate at which the investment income was normal-
ly taxed. 9 Consequently, it is impossible to determine a fixed
amount that can accurately reflect the tax benefits received by
employers on all recovered amounts in all circumstances. A fixed
rate will always be less precise than an individual calculation,
although it is much easier to administer and enforce. Alternatively,
the use of an increased variable rate schedule, adjusted for different
time periods, types of investment, and investment taxation can
provide more accuracy than a flat rate and greater administrative
ease than individual calculation. 9 '
If the goal is not to deter reversions, but only to recapture lost
revenue, a case by case method evaluating the exact tax benefits an
employer receives upon asset recovery is necessary to determine
with some precision the appropriate excise tax rate. For example,
an employer who invests excess plan assets in investments subject
to the maximum income tax rate, with all other things being equal,
would receive a greater tax benefit and, accordingly, have a higher
excise tax. Similarly, the excise tax rate would be lower if the
assets were sheltered in the pension plan for a shorter period of
time. If the rates were individually calculated, the excise tax would
not create a disincentive for employers to accelerate the funding of
their pension plans. Economically, employers would be no better or
worse off after plan termination for having overfunded their
plans. 9 ' An individually assessed tax is considerably more diffi-
cult to administer than a fixed rate or an adjustable rate; however,
using the results of the actuarial valuations92 to obtain informa-
tion on the period over which the excess assets existed, the amount
189. Id. at 2-3.
190. Effective October 1, 1990, the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990 changed the
excise tax rate. See infra part II.B.3 (discussing combination approach of Omnibus Recon-
ciliation Act).
191. while an individually-calculated excise tax may not deter employers from
overfunding their ongoing plans, the excise tax may still act as a disincentive for employ-
ers who wish to terminate their plans. In other words, rather than having to pay the
excise tax on the reverted assets at plan termination, the employer may elect to continue
the plan. However, this is a different consideration from deterring the employer from
overfunding ongoing plans.
192. The actuarial valuation is the process that involves the determination of existing
liabilities, the plan's available assets, and a funding arrangement for future contributions to
meet the obligations under the plan. See supra part I.
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of excess, and other relevant information could make the imple-
mentation of a case-by-case approach feasible.93
A significant shortcoming of an increased excise tax approach
is that plan participants do not necessarily benefit from surplus
assets as they would under methods like the actuarial limitation
model."9 Nevertheless, this approach is an effective method of
addressing reversions on plan termination without directly re-
stricting the accelerated funding of ongoing plans. It also presents a
worthwhile alternative to the err6neous actuarial calculation ap-
proach discussed in the previous section of this Article.
3. Current Law Under the 1990 Omnibus Reconciliation Act-
A Combination Approach
The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA) relies on a
combination approach to limit the recovery of excess assets on
plan termination. It merges an increased excise tax rate with an
optional provision for using a portion of the surplus to increase
plan participants' accrued benefits as a quid pro quo for reduced
rates. The Act amends existing law by raising the 15% ,excise tax
to 20% if the employer transfers 25% of the total assets received
on plan termination to a qualified replacement plan or provides a
pro-rata benefit increase using at least 25% of the recovered as-
sets.9 A 50% excise tax applies to recaptured amounts if the
employer does not establish a qualified replacement plan or de-
clines to provide the stated pro-rata benefit increases. 96
Because the 20% excise tax is not calculated according to the
actual amount of tax-subsidized benefits that an employer receives
from recovered amounts, the new law may be inadequate in recap-
turing tax gains. Moreover, while the 50% flat rate may theoreti-
cally be adequate in most cases, as a practical matter, it will prob-
ably never be applied. If the employer opts to use 25% of the
193. For a more detailed discussion on individual measurement, see infra part H.
194. See discussion supra part II.B.1 (discussing effort to limit asset reversion to em-
ployers under actuarial method).
195. Qualified replacement plans are plans established by the employer in connection
with a plan termination where at least 95% of the active participants in the terminated
plan remain as participants in the replacement plan. Pro-rata benefit increases in the ac-
crued benefits are those increases which result from a plan amendment made in connec-
tion with a plan termination which have an aggregate present value of at least 20% of
the maximum amount which the employer could receive as an employer reversion. I.R.C.
§ 4980(d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
196. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 (1987).
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surplus assets for plan participants and pays a 20% excise on the
surplus, the employer recovers 55% of the surplus."9 If the em-
ployer opts to pay the 50% excise tax, the employer recovers only
50% of the surplus. Therefore, on plan termination, the new law
effectively places a 45% tax on excess amounts when 25% is used
for plan participants and 20% is used to replace the tax benefits.
Thus, at 20%, the new excise tax rate will permit the Treasury to
recoup 5% more tax gains from the recovery of assets than the
prior 15% rate.
Equally important as the higher excise tax rate is the option
given to employers under the new law to pay lower rates in ex-
change for increased participant benefits. While the voluntary as-
pect of the option to redirect recovered amounts to plan partici-
pants implies that the law, to some extent, is still premised on the
belief that the employer has greater title to surplus amounts, the
new act strongly encourages the employer to use a portion of the
surplus assets for the benefit of plan participants. A fixed percent-
age, however, especially a 25% one, cannot accurately approximate
the expected retirement benefits of plan participants. As a conse-
quence, many employees may still receive substantially fewer re-
tirement benefits than that for which they paid, while the employer
recovers as much as 55%198 of the surplus.
Because of this preferential treatment of employers, the new
act's optional use requirement, like current recovery practices, is
viewed by participants' rights advocates as inconsistent with ERISA
which provides that "the assets of a plan shall never inure to the
benefit of any employer and shall be held for the exclusive pur-
pose of providing benefits to participants in the plan and their
beneficiaries..'.. Therefore, depending on one's view, OBRA may
be regarded as merely a starting point.
While the new act may fail to fully respond to some of the
critical issues presented by asset recovery on plan termination, it at
least focuses in part on the recapture of tax gains and the alloca-
tion of excess assets to plan participants. The enactment of similar
laws which recognize that participants are also entitled to a portion
of the excess assets should cause policymakers to rethink their
skepticism on overfunding and accept accelerated funding as desir-
197. 100% less 25% to plan participants less 20% excise tax equals 55%, the amount
of surplus which passes to the employer.
198. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing concept of asset reversion).
199. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
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able for plan participants. As a result, accelerated funding may be
eventually viewed as consistent with ERISA's goal of providing
more security for plan participants. The next section of this Article
explores whether accelerated funding, in the absence of plan termi-
nation, is consistent with public interest and pension policy.
mH. OVERFUNDING IN THE ABSENCE OF PLAN TERMINATION
As noted earlier, one of the reasons for the recent emphasis
on deterring "overfunding" is to minimize the incidence of asset
reversion on plan termination by reducing excess assets in ongoing
plans.' However, long before the subject of asset reversion was
debated, Congress imposed limitations on how much an employer
could deduct for contributions made to a pension plan."' These
limitations demonstrate Congress' belief that the public interest is
not best served by extending tax benefits for unlimited contribu-
tions made to qualified plans, even in the absence of the threat of
asset reversion.
While Congress has historically discouraged excess contribu-
tions to private pension plans by limiting deductions, it has also
promoted the establishment of private pension plans by affording
them substantial tax advantages.' z The purpose of the favorable
tax treatment of qualified pension plans is to provide employers
with an incentive to maintain private plans that enable lower and
moderate income employees to secure adequate savings for retire-
ment. As a way of assuring that employers will make good on
their promises to provide retirement benefitg to plan participants,
Congress imposed minimum levels of funding as a prerequisite to
the retention of tax benefits. °3
Before determining whether the funding limitations and prefer-
ential tax treatment are effective in accomplishing the desired re-
sults, it is necessary to know the specific goals of policymakers
and the extent to which they are willing to subsidize these goals.
Therefore, without regard to the asset recovery issues discussed in
the previous section, this segment of the Article examines current
pension law as it relates to the tension created by the maximum
200. See supra text accompanying note 11.
201. See generally Committee on Corporate Pension Funds and Other Private Retirement
and Welfare Programs, Public and Private Pension Programs Report to the President on
Private Employee Retirement Plans (January 1965) [hereinafter President's Report].
202. For a discussion of the tax advantages of qualified plans, see supra part I.
203. LR.C. § 412 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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funding limitation and the minimum funding requirements as well
as alternatives to the current law which may better implement their
sometimes conflicting goals.
A. Tax Incentives
When an employer believes that tax benefits will reduce the
cost of a retirement plan, the employer generally will be more
receptive to the idea of establishing a pension plan for the benefit
of its employees. Accordingly, in order to encourage the establish-
ment of more pension plans, Congress provided incentives in the
form of preferential tax treatment to employers who establish and
maintain qualified pension plans.2"4
The Treasury Department treats the tax advantages given to
private pension plans as a tax expenditure and regularly prepares
estimates of the revenue lost from the favorable tax treatment of
pension plans. Estimates for 1990 indicated that the tax expenditure
for private pension plans exceeded 48 billion dollars and will reach
61 billion dollars in 1994."' These figures are computed by sub-
tracting the taxes paid on pension distributions in a given year
from the foregone taxes attributable to the exclusion of employer
contributions and plan earnings in that same year.2"
Employer contributions and the interest earned on such
amounts are effectively substitutes for current wages. A comparison
between an employee's tax liability when the employer pays wages
exclusively in the form of cash wages and when the employer pays
in the form of both wages and qualified pension plan contributions
reveals the magnitude of the tax advantages given to pension plans.
The favorable tax treatment given to qualified pension plans pro-
vides the worker who receives part of her compensation in the
form of deferred pension payments with a higher after-tax income
over her lifetime. This reduction in lifetime taxes for employees
covered by qualified plans represents substantial amounts of
foregone revenue and proves to be a costly subsidy from the feder-
204. See discussion supra part I for a description of the tax advantages for qualified
plans.
205. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES
FOR FISCAL YEARS 1990-1994 (Comm. Print 1989).
206. The estimate of foregone revenue includes the revenue lost from the difference in
lower tax rates at retirement as compared to the higher rates which would be effective if
the contributions were taxable to the participants during their working years. Since the
difference in the highest rate and the lowest rate is not as great as in previous times, this
component of foregone revenue is not as critical as in prior years.
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al government.'
To numerically illustrate this point, assume that an employer
made a contribution to a qualified plan of $100 on behalf of an
employee in the 28% tax bracket. The employee will not pay taxes
on the contribution until later when she receives it in the form of a
retirement benefit. At retirement, however, she may. be on a fixed
income, and accordingly, in a tax bracket lower than her current
one. For example, instead of presently paying $28 in taxes on a
contribution of $100, she will pay $15 some 20 years later when
she retires." The Treasury thereby loses $13. It will also lose
the difference in the present value of $15 and its future discounted
value 20 years from today. The employee will rarely have to pay
the amount of taxes that she would have had the tax liability not
been deferred. Of course, the portion of the tax advantage attribut-
able to the change in tax bracket occurs only when the marginal
income tax rate at retirement significantly decreases as assumed in
this example.2"
To ensure that rank and file employees actually benefit from
qualified pension plans and are not discriminated against in favor
of highly compensated employees, Congress set limits on the ac-
crual disparity of a plan's benefit for low and high paid work-
ers.210 Despite these limitations, however, much of the tax expen-
diture for pension plans still disproportionately benefits higher paid
employees.', Because retirement benefits are often salary related,
higher paid employees generally receive larger retirement bene-
fits."' Moreover, the higher tax brackets of higher paid employ-
ees also contribute to the disparity between the tax benefits they
receive as compared to those received by lower paid employ-
ees." 3 Therefore, not only is the tax subsidy for retirement bene-
207. See AcIA H. MUNNELL, THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 50 (1982) (stat-
ing that the Treasury loses roughly $15 billion annually on special tax concessions to pri-
vate pension plans).
208. 15% is the lowest rate which could be effective at retirement provided present
rates do not change. See MARVIN A. CIRELSTEin , FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 13 (6th
ed. 1991).
209. By contrast, if tax rates go up the Treasury will experience a windfall.
210. I.R.C. § 401(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) provides that the contributions or benefits
provided by a qualified plan may not discriminate in favor of employees who are officers,
shareholders, or highly compensated. See also I.R.C. § 410(b) (1988) which requires that
qualified plans operate in a nondiscriminatory manner.
211. See MUNNELL, supra note 207, at 45.
212. See id.
213. Pension amounts vary more than proportionally with wages. In 1978 the median
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fits extremely costly, but it subsidizes greater benefits for higher
paid employees.
The deferral of tax liability is equivalent to an interest-free
loan from the Treasury to the employee, the higher the tax bracket
of an individual, the greater the loan.214 Using the above exam-
ple, if the employee is in the 15% tax bracket, the annual interest-
free loan from the Treasury would be $.15 on each dollar of con-
tribution. An employee in the 28% tax bracket would receive an
interest-free loan of $.28 on each dollar of contribution.
Regardless of how one characterizes the tax benefits, the reve-
nue lost from the preferential tax treatment of employer contribu-
tions and pension fund earnings is significant."5 Notwithstanding
this substantial cost, the underlying reasons for the tax incentives
are seldom questioned because saving for retirement is generally
accepted as a goal worthy of support. The extent to which it is
desirable to grant such benefits does, however, give rise to various
limitation issues.
B. Limitations on Favorable Tax Treatment
In an effort to reduce the tax expenditure for retirement sav-
ings and to cap the tax benefits enjoyed by an individual worker,
Congress placed limitations on individual benefit accruals, particu-
larly those of highly compensated employees. Section 415 of the
Internal Revenue Code provides that the maximum annual benefit
paid from a tax-qualified defined benefit plan is limited to the
lesser of 100% of the participant's average compensation or
$90,000.216 The driving force behind this limitation appears to be
the recognition that excessively large retirement benefits
disproportionately benefit highly compensated employees who do
not need tax subsidies to encourage them to save for retire-
ment.217
annual pension for those with an annual income of $19,000 or greater was approximately
10 times greater than the median for those with an annual income under $6,000. See
PENSION STATISTICS, supra note 96, at 131.
214. See Halperin, supra note 6, at 512 (discussing the hidden interest advantages aris-
ing when tax liability is deferred).
215. See MUNNELL, supra note 207, at 50 (estimating losses to the Treasury as a result
of tax benefits from plans).
216. The $90,000 is indexed for inflation so that the number in effect for 1991 is
$108,963. I.R.C. § 415(d) (1988).
217. See MUNNELI, supra note 207, at 51 (recognizing that the favorable treatment of
qualified plans gives lower paid employees the incentive to save for retirement); see also
Halperin, supra note 6, at 539 (describing benefits for highly paid individuals as an "un-
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Congress further reduced the tax expenditure for pension bene-
fits by placing limitations on the rate at which employers can fund
for and deduct plan costs. The funding limitations are found in
section 412 of the Internal Revenue Code." 8  Section 404,
working in conjunction with section 412, establishes the annual
limitation on deductible employer contributions." 9 It provides that
the employer may always contribute the amount necessary to com-
ply with the minimum funding requirements of section 412, but in
no event is the employer entitled to a deduction greater than the
applicable full funding limitation.2 Thus, section 404, unlike sec-
tion 415, affects the rate at which an employer can deduct the
costs of pension benefits without affecting the size of individual
pension benefits.
Section 404(a)(1)(E) provides that the excess of any amount
contributed over the maximum deductible limit for the year can be
carried over to the following year.2 ' The 10% excise tax on non-
deductible contributions applies, however, for as long as a plan is
overfunded and serves to offset any tax benefits attributable to the
overfunded amounts as well as to penalize the employer for
overfunding. Therefore, the excise tax could put an employer
who contributes in excess of the deductible limitation in a worse
position than if the employer had not made additional contributions
to the plan.' Consequently, for all practical purposes, the impo-
sition of the excise tax on nondeductible contributions has rendered
the carryover option sufficiently unattractive to eliminate it as a
business option.
While the reasons for the funding limitations may be valid,
the effects of imposing additional restrictions on the maximum
funding limitations in ongoing pension plans must be weighed
against the overall goal of encouraging employers to maintain
financially secure plans. As more individuals encounter increasing
warranted subsidy [that] undermines the incentives created by Congress").
218. I.R.C. § 412 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (providing the minimum funding standards).
219. LR.C. § 404(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (providing limitations on deductions for
employer contributions to plans deferring employee compensation).
220. .IC. § 412(c)(7) (1988).
221. The carryover, combined with the next year's annual contribution, is deductible in
the following year subject to that year's maximum deductible limit. A contribution carry-
over that is not deducted in the first year in which it may be deducted is lost forever.
However, there is no limit to the amount of carryover nor to the number of years to
which the carryover may be applied until fully deducted. I.R.C. § 404(a)(1)(E) (1988).
222. See I.R.C. § 4972 (1988).
223. See infra part E for a numerically illustrated application of the excise tax.
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difficulty in saving for retirement, the incentives to maintain and
establish financially secure pension plans become more impor-
tant.' Allowing employers to accelerate funding for legitimate
reasons will give employers more flexibility in structuring their tax
liability, and will also create additional financial security for plan
participants in the long run.' The latter result is thus socially
desirable and consistent with the specific funding goals of ERISA.
C. The Limitation Policy of Section 404
The funding limitations are based upon the theory that an
employer obtains too great a subsidy if given the flexibility to
accelerate funding beyond certain levels. As noted, in order to limit
the favorable tax treatment of retirement benefits to appropriate
amounts, Congress limited both the individual benefits of plan
participants and the rate at which employers can fund for the plan
benefits. Thus, the funding limitations appear to define a reasonable
cost allocation of socially desirable levels of retirement income.
Viewed in isolation, section 415, which pertains to the limita-
tion of individual benefits rather than to that of overall deductibili-
ty," is generally beyond the scope of this Article. However, just
as section 404 attempts to identify an appropriate level for deduct-
ible employer contributions, section 415 attempts to define the
appropriate level of replacement income for which the deductions
are allowed. 27 Section 404(j), added to the Code in 1982, incor-
porates by reference the section 415 benefit limitation so that these
two provisions operate together. Section 4040) provides, in perti-
nent part, that in computing the allowable deductible amount in a
given plan year, no amount in excess of the 415 limitation on
defined benefit plans may be considered for deduction purpos-
es.' Thus, an employer may not deduct under section 404 a
benefit which cannot accrue under section 415. Tlus outcome sug-
224. Saving is more difficult for reasons such as inflation, which decreases the value of
the dollar. Also, consumer credit arrangements that allow people to consume beyond cur-
rent earnings make saving more difficult.
225. Employers can achieve additional funding flexibility by providing in the plan doc-
ument that the employer will annually contribute the rmmmum amount required by
ERISA's minimum funding standard as well as any other amount the employer might de-
termine in its discretion.
226. I.R.C. § 415 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
227. Halperin, supra note 104, at 162.
228. I.R.C. § 404(j)(1)(A) (1988) provides that "in the case of a defined benefit plan,
there shall not be taken into account any benefits for any year in excess of any limitation
on such benefits under section 415 for such year."
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gests that, while the deductible contribution limitation is separate
from the accrual limitation, both limitations attempt to eliminate
the favorable tax treatment of disproportionately large retirement
benefits in qualified plans. The policy behind both limitations is to
identify the levels of retirement income for which Congress be-
lieves preferential tax treatment is appropriate.
Legislative history indicates that prior to the enactment of
Code section 415, policymakers were concerned about the cost and
distributional effects of the favorable tax treatment of qualified
plans. Specifically, the concern was that the tax expenditures asso-
ciated with pension plans were not being used as intended, that
they were being used for purposes other than to help low to mod-
erate income earners save for their retirement. It was feared that
tax expenditures were being used primarily to provide an opportu-
nity for employers and highly paid individuals to avoid their tax
liability. These concerns, addressed currently by section 415, were
expressed as early as 1965 by the President's Committee on Cor-
porate Pension FundsY9 The Committee called for the imposition
of an appropriate dollar limitation on contributions to qualified
plans in order to prevent abuse and restrict favored tax treatment to
reasonable amounts. The Committee determined that it was not
appropriate to help finance by means of special tax treatment ex-
cessively large retirement benefits."0
The statutory language of section 415, however, does not fully
comport with congressional concern over the extremely large bene-
fits of highly compensated employees. Section 415 limits annual
'benefits to the lesser of full compensation or $90,000.23 Yet, sec-
tion 415 makes no exception for disproportionately large benefits
that accrue to lower paid employees and also subjects their benefits
to the 100% compensation limitation. 2 Had Congress wanted to
make allowances for a situation in which lower paid employees
stood to receive a larger benefit, the limitation could easily have
been defined in terms of a fixed or indexed dollar amount. Similar-
ly, an exception for the deduction of such benefits could also have
been permitted under section 404. Thus, with respect to section
415, Congress was concerned with limiting the retirement benefits
of all employees, regardless of their levels of compensation, in
229. See President's Report, supra note 201, at 59.
230. Id. at 62.
231. I.R.C. § 415(b)(1) (1988).
232. Id.
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order to reduce revenue loss as well as to provide a savings pro-
cess that produces retirement benefits commensurate with the
participant's salary history.
Therefore, encouraging the work force to save adequately for
old age maintenance appears to be but one of the goals of pension
policy; another is limiting tax-subsidized retirement income to
specific levels of savings. In addition to restricting excessively
large benefits, the section 415 limitation seeks to establish a guide-
line for identifying what amount constitutes a true pension, and by
direct implication, what amount represents the true annual cost of
such benefits.
While it is difficult to identify what a true pension is, section
415 indicates that retirement savings should neither be greater than
one's earnings during a working career nor excessively large. The
general goal of pension policy is to ensure a lifestyle during retire-
ment as comfortable as the lifestyle enjoyed during the participant's
working career. Consequently, Congress does not attempt to help
workers save for retirement benefits that exceed 100% of their
current earnings. 3 Moreover, section 415's limitation on annual
compensation in excess of $200,000 indicates that at high levels of
income, individuals are expected to save on their own;' they are
not encouraged to do so by tax subsidies.
In its enforcement of the funding limitations, the Tax Court
has determined that it is inappropriate for actuaries to recognize
indexed adjustments to increase the funding limitations even when
they are specifically scheduled in the Code. In Feichtinger v. Com-
missioner," the Tax Court rejected the advanced funding of au-
tomatic cost-of-living adjustments and adhered to the dollar limita-
tion on the benefits payable under a defined benefit plan. 6 The
court held that the benefit limitations of section 415 were intended
to prevent taxpayers from financing large pensions at public ex-
pense through the use of qualified pension plans. 7 In the court's
view, allowing benefit deductions for the advanced funding of
benefits in excess of the current limitations, even if the contribu-
tions reduced plan costs later, would not further the underlying
233. See I.R.C. § 415(b)(1)(B) (1988) (limiting annual benefit paid to 100% of the
participant's average salary).
234. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(17) (1988).
235. 80 T.C. 239 (1983).
236. Id. at 249-250.
237. Id.
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goals of the benefits limitation policy."3
The automatic cost-of-living adjustments to which the court
referred are found in sections 415 and 401 of the Code. Section
415(d) provides an automatic adjustment to the benefit accrual
limitation under section 415 in order to recognize future infla-
tionY 9 Section 401(a)(17) allows future increases, to the $200,000
annual compensation limitation.2'
While an actuary is not permitted to anticipate indexed in-
creases for funding purposes, the actuary is allowed to use a salary
scale increase to estimate future plan experience in connection with
the use of certain projected cost methods.24 However, taking fu-
ture salary increases into account has the same effect as taking ex-
pected automatic increases into account. In both instances, the
actuary is funding for benefits expected to accrue in future years.
Both situations result in higher contributions and deductible limits.
Nevertheless, policymakers perceive the indexed adjustments for
inflation and the use of a salary scale projection to anticipate in-
creases in compensation as distinct concepts. It appears that the
major difference in the two concepts is that projected salary in-
creases anticipate future plan experience. Accordingly, the employer
and its actuaries are better able to judge whether a salary scale is
reasonable based upon historical data or the employer's own busi-
ness judgement. Apparently, policymakers believed that it would be
inappropriate for Congress to set limitations on salary increases if
they in fact reasonably represented the compensation upon which
the retirement benefit would ultimately be based. For this reason,
employers are allowed to fund for projected wage increases to
ensure that there will be enough assets on hand to provide the
benefits when they become due.
In contrast, Congress provided indexed increases in the Code
to avoid the need to amend certain provisions every year. They are
in the Code solely for convenience and are not intended to have
any effect until their respective effective dates.242 In other words,
238. Id.
239. I.R.C. § 415(d) (1988).
240. I.R.C. § 401(a)(17) (1988). The Internal Revenue Code prohibits a p!an's actuary
from considering the indexed amounts in their plan assumptions. I.R.C. §§ 404(), (1)
(1988).
241. Under some actuarial cost methods the actuary does not assume a salary scale ad-
justment, while under others the actuary is required to do so. See SCHOENLY, supra note
181, at 11.
242. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 415(d) (1988).
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unlike current section 415 limitations, which are attempts to define
appropriate levels of retirement income based upon present eco-
nomic conditions, the indexed amounts describe a level that is
viewed as inappropriately high under current conditions. Allowing
employers to recognize the indexed amounts would make these
amounts the effective savings levels and would represent amounts
considered excessive under current conditions.
As discussed in part I, funding methods allocate current costs
and amortized portions of past service cost over the life of the
plan. Future plan costs are not funded in advance.243 This means
that costs relating explicitly to future costs, as well as ones dis-
guised as past service cost, may not be pre-funded. The unlawful
prepayment of future service costs, or the misallocation of past
service costs,2' are believed to cause excessively large benefit
accruals. One method of misallocating past service liability is
through the use of extremely "frontloaded" benefit formulas which
provide for the accrual of significantly larger benefits during the
early years of participation. There is concern that these formulas
can be used to avoid the statutory amortization periods for past
service liabilities by substituting larger benefit accruals for earlier
years instead of giving credit for past service.245 As a result, cur-
rent costs in the initial years of the plan would be larger, making
the deductible contribution level greater than if credit for past ser-
vice had been given and its cost amortized over a period of at
least ten years as required by law.246 The Internal Revenue Ser-
vice has been particularly concerned about this tax avoidance
scheme in connection with smaller employers. Because of small
numbers of employees, these employers are not as concerned as
larger employers about the anti-discrimination rules that force em-
ployers to give the same benefit to all plan participants. In re-
243. See supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text (explaining the system by which the
plan is funded).
244. A plan gives past service credit when it recognizes service before the establishment
of the plan. Past service cost is the liability of a pension plan for the benefits attributable
to past service credit. See MCGILL & GRUBBS, supra note 19, at 270-76.
245. See, e.g., Jerome Mirza & Assoc. v. United States, 692 F. Supp. 918, 921-22,
(C.D. Ill. 1988) (stating that § 415 "requires the plan to reasonably allocate the benefit
between past and present service"), affd 882 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495
U.S. 929 (1990).
246. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text discussing 30-year amortization. Ten
years is the shortest period over which supplemental costs can be amortized. Ten-year
amortization would produce larger deductions than the longer amortization periods provid-
ed in the statute.
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sponse, the Service has indicated that it will reduce the deduction
to appropriate amounts when it determines that this scheme has
been used in order to prevent taxpayers from circumventing the
deduction limitations under section 404.
While the Service has taken a hard-line position on past ser-
vice allocations,247 the distinction between past service credit and
future accruals is unclear at best. It is a difficult, if not impossible,
task to determine when an employer has concealed past service
credit with larger benefit accruals. Any time an employer has gen-
erous benefit accruals or does not backload the plan's benefit for-
mula, there could be a case of misallocating past service credit.
While it is difficult to distinguish between past service credit and
current liability, it is equally difficult to understand why such a
classification is ever necessary. If one believes that reduced wages
in fact fund the benefits provided by private pension plans, then
from the employee's perspective, there is no difference between
past service costs and future accruals.24 The projected benefit is
simply the funding goal of the plan. According to this view, all
costs to the participant are future costs. As such, there is no need
to distinguish past service from future service. There is also no
need to impose additional restrictions on the deductibility of past
service cost. Section 404(a)(1), which limits the employers annual
contribution, would be sufficient.249
On the other hand, if one believes that past service benefits
are entirely related to past periods of service, then current compen-
sation would not be reduced to fund past service costs. Theoretical-
ly, compensation from previous periods would have been cut to
fund the benefits attributable to past service. Therefore, under this
theory, past service costs, regardless of the amount, should be
immediately deductible.' 0
Perhaps one of the reasons employers are required to amortize
the cost of past service liability, as opposed to immediately deduct-
247. See Mirza, 629 F. Supp. at 922-23 (finding the taxpayer's interest rate assumption
under 26 U.S.C. § 412(c)(3) to be unreasonable).
248. For a discussion of the effect of pension contributions on current wages, see supra
notes 126-36 and accompanying text.
249. I.R.C. § 404(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) provides, in pertinent part, that deduc-
tions for contributions are limited to the full funding limitation for the year in which the
contribution was made.
250. Generally, the maximum amount an employer may deduct in a plan year is the
sum of the normal cost and an amount sufficient to amortize the unfunded past service
liability over ten years. See supra part I.A.2 for a discussion on current funding law.
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ing it, is the concern that taxpayers, if allowed to deduct past
service cost at once, would be able to anticipate changes in the tax
rates and accordingly reduce their overall tax burdens."' In other
words, when rates were expected to rise, making deductions more
valuable, employers would defer their funding of past service costs
by electing longer amortization periods. When rates were expected
to fall, making deductions less valuable, employers would fund for
past service immediately. However, this problem could be solved
with transitional rules that minimize such windfalls. For example,
when tax rates increase, an employer would be prohibited from
increasing the rate at which she funded the past service cost be-
yond a certain percentage.
A full exploration of the extent to which the funding limita-
tions and their underlying policy depend on the distinction between
past service and future service is beyond the scope of this Article.
With the exception of this section of the Article, the limitation
issues addressed throughout this paper are based solely upon future
service costs, costs attributable to service that begins on the date
the plan is established.
One of the most troubling aspects of allowing current deduc-
tions for the advanced funding of future benefits is that employers
receive a present tax advantage for contributions which have not
yet accrued to plan participants. Thus, under current law, if the
participant separates from service early"2 or the plan terminates
prematurely, amounts used to fund the future benefits could be
reallocated to the employer, notwithstanding the fact that the em-
ployees paid for the benefits with reduced wages and the employer
received favorable tax treatment for the non-accrued amounts."
251. Rev. Rul. 64-159, 1964-1 C.B. 164.
252. Generally, when a participant separates from service before five years, the employer
is permitted to forfeit the nonvested portion of the participant's accrued benefit. In a
defined benefit plan, forfeitures are used to reduce the employer's contributions in subse-
quent plan years. If a plan funds for nonaccrued benefits, such amounts would not be in-
cluded in the participant's vested accrued benefit. These amounts would be considered ex-
perience gain if the employee were to terminate employment early. Thus, the employer
would then be able to use immediately the excess amounts to reduce annual plan contri-
butions. Unlike vested accrued benefits, if the employee were to return, such amounts
most likely would not be reinstated, although they were paid for with the participant's
reduced wages. Consequently, restricting funding to accrued benefits prevents employers
from forcing employees to save more than they are entitled to receive. See DAN M.
McGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS, 126-29 (3d ed. 1975) (discussing the
impact on benefit rights due to withdrawal from a plan prior to retirement).
253. For a discussion on reversions, see supra part II.A.
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When deductions are limited to accrued benefits, the employees'
wage reduction better represents the benefits which they are enti-
tled to receive. As a result, when participants separate from service
early or on premature plan termination, the employer's potential
windfall is reduced.
Alternatively, if one believes that wages are not reduced to
fund future accruals, then arguably the contributions for such
amounts are not truly savings for retirement. Employer contribu-
tions to qualified plans are deductible by the employer at the time
the contribution is made, but are not taxed to the employee until
the benefits are ultimately distributed.' The rationale for the de-
ductibility of the contributions is that they represent compensation,
payable at retirement or some other future event. 5 The employee
receives compensation in the form of both current wages and de-
ferred wages. Consequently, present wages are reduced to the ex-
tent that there are deferred wages. Therefore, employer contribu-
tions to pension plans are ordinary business expenses and, as such,
are deductible like other forms of compensation.26 However, if
current wages are not actually reduced to fund the retirement bene-
fits, then it would be inappropriate to allow employers to take
present deductions for their contributions because these amounts do
not represent deferred compensation.
Another reason for promoting a policy that disallows deduc-
tions for amounts that have not yet accrued is to reduce forced
savings. Under a policy that permitted deductions for future accru-
als, employees who prefer to use a larger portion of their compen-
sation for immediate consumption would effectively be forced to
save even more from their current wages for retirement.27 The
current policy permits employers to force workers to save for re-
tirement only to the extent that the employees are entitled to re-
ceive the benefits. The policy restricts the employer's ability to
254. Rev. Rul. 64-159, 1964-1 C.B. 164, interprets Treas. Reg. 1.404(a)-l(b) to provide
that contributions may be deducted under I.R.C. § 404(a) only to the extent that they are
"ordinary and necessary" expenses and are "compensation for personal services actually
rendered."
255. Other distributional events may include, for example, death or early retirement. See
I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(9), (14) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
256. Ordinarily, such amounts would be taxable to the employee at the time the em-
ployer took the deduction. However, see supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the preferential tax treatment of amounts contributed to a qualified pension
plan.
257. See Ippolito, supra note 118, at 84-85.
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force employees to save for benefits which they may or may not
receive."8  Therefore, in addition to eliminating a potential
windfall for the employer, the prohibition on deductions for future
accruals effectively limits the level at which employers will decide
to reduce wages for purposes of funding retirement savings.
D. Motivation to Accelerate Funding
Because an employer subject to federal income tax is usually
reluctant to contribute more than can be deducted in a plan year,
the availability of a deduction is important in the decision of how
much to contribute. An employer's current tax position may deter-
mine whether she elects to accelerate funding or not. For example,
an employer may choose to minimize contributions in years where
there is little or no taxable income, and maximize contributions in
years where there is ample income against which deductions can be
appliedY9 An employer who has substantial profits, but limited
cash due to commitments such as future plant expansion, may find
it advantageous to reduce annual contributions to the minimum
level. On the other hand, an employer in a strong cash position
may recognize that an additional dollar paid this year reduces
required contributions in future years and may decide to make
accelerated contributions in excess of the minimum contribution
level. Prior to the imposition of the 10% excise tax on non-deduct-
ible contributions,2" an employer in this situation may have even
elected to make contributions in excess of the maximum deductible
limitation in order to take advantage of the tax-free build-up." t
When an employer's after-tax rate of investment outside the
plan is approximately equal to the expected before-tax rate of
return inside the plan, it is unlikely that an employer with discre-
tionary funds would choose to put them in a pension plan. Under
these circumstances, the employer could invest the money outside
the plan at comparable after-tax interest rates and keep the money
available for immediate use.262 Even when the inside rate has a
258. See supra note 18 for a description of accrued benefits on plan termination in a
defined benefit plan.
259. See MCGILL & GRuBmS, supra note 19, at 415-21 (discussing funding patterns).
260. I.R.C. § 4972(a) (1988).
261. See supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
262. The prohibited transaction rules prevent employers from removing contributions
made to a pension plan for any reason other than the exclusive benefit of plan partici-
pants. See supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also supra note 114 (describing an
exception for amounts contributed by mistake).
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slightly greater expected return than the outside rate, an employer
may not be inclined to relinquish control of the funds for a small
difference.263 Thus, for the employer making the decision to
overfund solely on the basis of expected investment return, the in-
side rate would have to be substantially greater in order for an
employer to make additional contributions to a pension plan.
An employer's -borrowing cost may also determine whether
and to what extent the employer will choose to increase the level
of plan funding. Because the earnings on pension plan assets are
not taxable,' 4 an employer is likely to borrow money in order to
make larger contributions to the plan if she expects the before-tax
investment return inside the plan to be greater than the after-tax
rate at which she borrowed.265 Thus, after comparing the cost of
incurring additional debt to the expected rate of return for addition-
al contributions made to the plan, an employer may choose to
borrow and accelerate funding. The employer's marginal tax rate is
an important factor in this comparison and determines whether in-
creases in plan funding in conjunction with borrowing is desirable.
The employer's size is yet another factor that influences
whether and to what extent the employer views accelerated funding
as beneficial.' A small employer with few plan participants
might be motivated to accelerate funding to take advantage of the
greater tax benefits which result. Any increase in profits directly
affects the small employer's economic position whereas with large
companies, the increase in profits affects the economic position of
the shareholders. In addition, smaller employers often hire family
members and friends; consequently, they may feel a commitment
beyond that required by the law to ensure that adequate funds are
available when they become due. As a result, smaller employers
are more likely than larger employers to invest additional funds in
the plan in order to improve its financial stability.
Small plans are often the subject of Internal Revenue Service
audits. It is generally believed that in order to take larger deduc-
tions than ordinarily permitted under section 404, employers of
small companies deliberately accelerate funding by using the most
263. See infra part Ml.E for further discussion on investment rates.
264. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
265. Halperin, supra note 6, at 515-19 (explaining the relative advantages and disadvan-
tages of accelerated pension fund payments and their impact on the employer's tax posi-
tion).
266. See ITELSON, supra note 83, at 2.
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conservative actuarial assumptions that they can justify. 67 Be-
cause a change in the interest rate assumption will usually affect
the valuation results more than a change in any other assumption,
the interest rate assumption is closely scrutinized on audit.268
Notwithstanding the fact that many small employers are inter-
ested in using their pension plans to minimize tax liability, the
actuaries of small plans are very likely to select conservative or
simplified interest assumptions purely for actuarial reasons.' A
conservative selection is appropriate for smaller employers because
yearly fluctuations in plan experience are likely to be greater, plan
experience does not provide a meaningful match for decrements,
and a statistically valid salary scale cannot be derived in very
small groups." In some cases, neither a salary scale nor a pre-
retirement mortality assumption is even used. Thus, the use of
more conservative interest rate assumptions is necessary in order to
compensate for these factors, which, although not reliably determi-
nable, ultimately affect the funding status of the plan."'
The inability to readily offset actuarial error is characteristic of
smaller plans because the number of employees in a plan affects
the degree of self-correction for erroneous actuarial assumptions. In
order to minimize the risk of inadequate funding, a smaller em-
ployer may wish to have more assets on hand than required by
law.272 For example, a small plan that provides an early death
benefit may have insufficient funds in the event of a premature
death. Pay-out of the accrued benefit would occur sooner than
anticipated thereby depriving the plan of adequate time to build up
to the expected level. As a result, there may not be sufficient as-
sets. The smaller employer will be unable to contend with such
actuarial errors unless the plan's funding has been accelerated
either by using conservative interest rate assumptions or by contrib-
uting in excess of the 404 deductible contribution limitation. In
contrast, a large plan has a more variable structure so that actuarial
error can be spread over more lives and more experience. In a
267. See Stein, supra note 87, for discussion of the appropriateness of defined benefit
plans for small employers because of their ability to take large deductions as a result of
using conservative assumptions and favorable funding methods.
268. It has been determined that a 1/4% change in the interest rate assumption results
in a change of about 6% in liabilities. SCHOENLEY, supra note 181, at 13-14.
269. ITELSON, supra note 83, at 2.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 5.
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large plan there is seldom a realistic fear of having insufficient
assets due to actuarial error.
Another set of circumstances which makes it necessary for
actuaries to choose conservative actuarial assumptions is the dis-
allowance of funding for benefits that are not yet in the plan.
Benefit increases attributable to inflation, or the indexed section
415 maximum benefit limitation, cannot be taken into account for
funding purposes.' Again, in smaller plans where an increase in
plan cost is more critical, the actuary must compensate for the
plan's inability to recognize inflation in the benefit structure by
using conservative interest assumptions.274
When a plan's assets are depleted because of inaccurate as-
sumptions, the plan experiences a loss which, on an amortized
schedule, causes annual contributions to increase when all other
things are equal.275 However, if productivity declines substantially,
due to the loss of one of two employees, for instance, there may
not be sufficient profits from which to make the additional annual
contributions. The plan may be forced to terminate because of
financial hardship, and would do so with insufficient assets.
Intentional overfunding can be accomplished by making contri-
butions over the deductible limitation or by using conservative
actuarial assumptionsY6 Intentional overfunding may result from
a desire either to avoid current tax liability or to ensure additional
funding security for the plan. Because these two motivations are
not mutually exclusive, it is conceptually difficult to separate them.
To the extent that overfunding is aimed at avoiding tax liability,
the funding limitations do not create a hardship; however, to the
extent that they deter employers from providing additional security
for plan participants, they are unduly burdensome.
While it is not the case that nonconservative assumptions
routinely produce funding deficiencies, experience losses do fre-
quently occur.2' To the extent that we allow employers, small
273. See supra notes 239-42 and accompanying text for discussion on the effect of in-
dexed cost-of-living adjustments on the funding limitations.
274. See ITELSON, supra note 83, at 5.
275. See McGILL & GRUBBS, supra note 19, at 383-85 (discussing additional funding
requirements for single employer plans arising when a plan has an underfunded current
liability).
276. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text (discussing limits on contributions);
supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (discussing OBRA's limitations on interest rate
assumptions).
277. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 34, at 229 (discussing the impact of actuarial
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and large alike, to establish defined benefit plans, pension policy
should allow employers to fund for such events.2" Flexibility to
accelerate funding could prove to be critical for some employers
and employees when faced with experience losses. Therefore, em-
ployers who choose to do so either by using conservative assump-
tions or by contributing over the maximum deductible limitation
should not be penalized.
The remaining portion of this Article focuses on the funding
security motivation rather than the tax avoidance motivation for in-
tentional accelerated funding. It explores an alternative to the flat
10% excise tax on nondeductible contributions which neither favors
nor disfavors legitimate accelerated funding.
E. Plan Investment Performance
Where bias against accelerated funding stems from the belief
that the deferral of taxation on pension fund earnings prompts
employers to make excessively large contributions to their pension
plans, the overfunding theory is highly speculative. This conclusion
assumes that the tax advantages afforded to private pension plans
make investment inside a plan preferable to investment outside a
plan. This would be the case if: (1) money not invested in a plan
were usually invested in nondeductible sources, or (2) the rate of
return on investments inside plans were equal to that outside the
plans. However, these two assumptions are seldom, if ever, true.
Generally, an employer will compare investing additional
amounts in the plan with other profitable uses of the available
funds. In order to avoid tax liability, an employer might consider
tax-exempt municipal bonds as an alternative to the taxable savings
account, for example. The employer who chooses to remain in
business believes that additional money put into the business yields
a better return than passive investments; therefore, alternative uses
such as plant or equipment expansion are generally preferable to a
taxable savings account or other passive, taxable investments. 9
Due to risk constraints and tax consequences, investment prac-
assumptions of interest rate).
278. See Stein, supra note 87, at 1407. Stein discusses the possibility of prohibiting the
establishment of small defined benefit plans. However, until the establishment of small de-
fined benefit plans is restricted in this manner, concern over their abuse should not affect
the entire funding world.
279. See VEAL & MACKIEWICZ, supra note 57, at 207 (asserting that the argument that
companies build up surplus pension fund assets fails to take into account managerial
decision-making which considers other profitable investments).
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tices of pension plans typically differ from those of taxable funds.
Pension trust investment managers are "primarily growth-oriented
and stress long-term price appreciation and capital preservation"
over current dividends and interest returns."' Consequently, most
employers do not believe that, in the short-run, putting additional
money into their pension plans would be more profitable than
putting it elsewhere.
A study performed by the U.S. Department of Labor showed
that over the years of 1968 through 1983, plans subject to ERISA
significantly underperformed market bench marks."' The total
portfolio yield over this period for pension plans used in the study
was 6.7%.2 While this figure was higher than two of the bond
indexes used in the study, it was lower than the return on 91-day
U.S. Treasury Bills. Inflation over this same period was 7.1%."
Thus, the sample of plans studied earned a negative real return.'
Accordingly, unless the tax advantages offset the lower investment
returns, an employer who accelerated funding during this period
most likely experienced a lower after-tax return on the additional
contributions than it would have in an outside market.
Notwithstanding the apparent tax incentives to do so, most
large and medium-sized employers do not accelerate funding by
contributing amounts in excess of the minimum deductible limita-
tion to their pension plans.' During times of high investment
returns, many of these employers decreased their contributions
rather than increased them. 6 Therefore, many employers simply
do not perceive the tax advantages given to qualified pension plans
as an adequate incentive to accelerate the funding of their plans.
While smaller employers are undoubtedly just as interested in
maximizing their investment return as medium and large employers,
small employers are more inclined to accelerate the funding of
their pension plans for such reasons as securing sufficient funds to
contend with experience losses and avoiding tax liability.' To
accomplish these objectives, small employers usually rely on low
280. GAO Report, supra note 160, at 14.
281. ITELSON, supra note 83. at 15.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 16.
285. See IPPOLITO, supra note 136, at 159 (noting that most pension plans are
underfunded and the resulting tax implications).
286. See IPPOLITO, supra note 136, at 70 (Table 4-5 and accompanying text).
287. See supra notes 266-72 and accompanying text.
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investment yield assumptions or conservative funding methods that
allow a build-up of greater assets and higher costs over the life of
the plan.2 The fact that many small plans are established primar-
ily to reduce current tax liability has contributed to the perception
that there is wide-spread abuse in the form of the manipulation of
actuarial assumptions and funding methods, both of which serve to
inflate the deductible limits. Thus, the recent emphasis on discour-
aging accelerated funding has specifically targeted small employers.
Under current law, overfunded amounts are not deductible
under section 404 of the Code and are subject to a 10% excise tax
for as long as a plan remains overfunded. 9 While these mea-
sures are designed to prevent employers from abusing the preferen-
tial tax treatment given pension plans, they fail to distinguish legit-
imate overfunding from abusive overfunding. As long as employers
who choose to accelerate funding do not receive additional tax
benefits for doing so, the tax system is not undermined by acceler-
ated funding. Since small employers are allowed to adopt defined
benefit plans, congressional action should focus solely on eliminat-
ing any additional tax benefits from overfunding, rather than on
eliminating the practice of overfunding altogether. If Congress is
worried about giving tax benefits to employee-owners who have no
rank and file workers, enacting a plan size limitation that prohibits
such employers from establishing defined benefit plans provides a
better solution. In any event, Congress should not allow its con-
cerns about isolated situations to dictate the funding policy for all
plans as its recent emphasis suggests.29 If a different approach
were adopted so that overfunding was neither favored nor
disfavored relative to the tax treatment of outside investments, em-
ployers would have a choice of making additional contributions to
their pension plans at no additional cost to the Treasury.
Consider the following example in which there are two em-
ployers, Employer 1 and Employer 2. Both employers have con-
tributed the maximum tax deductible amount to their respective
defined benefit plans and have $5,000 after-tax dollars to invest.
Assume a marginal tax rate of 28% for both employers and an
interest rate of 8%.
288. ITELsON, supra note 83, at 2.
289. I.R.C. § 4972(a) (1988).
290. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
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Part 1
Employer 1 invests $5,000 in the plan on 1/1/91 with 8% invest-
ment return. Assume 28% tax rate and 10% Excise Tax.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Date 8% Tax-Free 10% Excise Int. Payment Tax Savings P.V. of P.V. of
Account Tax for from Int. Int. Tax
Balance Excise Tax Deduction Payment Savings
Borrowed @
8%
111191 S5.000 - -
111192 5,400 540 -..
11/93 5,832 583 43 12 54 15
111194 6,299 630 90 25 106 30
1/1/95 6,803 680 140 39 157 44
11I196 7,347 735 194 54 205 57
E3.168 467 130 522 146
Employer 1 has $7,347 in
$5,000 on 1/1/96.
Out-of-Pocket Cost:









6; P.V. of Int. Paid)
(Column 7; value of 500 de-
duction)
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Part 2
Employer 2 invests $5,000 outside the plan on 1/1/91 in nonde-
ductible fund with 8% investment return. Assume 28% tax rate.
1 2 3 4 5
Date Taxable Interest Income Tax Paid (1.0576* x Tax)
Account Income on Int. Income Interest on
Balance Borrowed Income Tax
After Tax Deduction
1/1191 S5.000 $ - --
1/1192 5.400 400 112 140
1/1/93 5,832 432 121 143
1/194 6,299 467 131 147
1/195 6.803 503 141 149




Employer 2 has $7,347
$7,347 to plan on 1/1/96 and takes deduc-
in plan on 1/1/96.




$ 731 (Column 5; Int. on Borrowed





x .28 (tax rate)
$2,057
Employer 2 is better off than Employer 1.
Employer 1 has an additional cost of $2,144.
Employer 2 has a gain of $1,326.
Therefore, there is a $3,470 difference in Employer l's economic
position as compared with Employer 2's.
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Part 3
Assume same as Employer 1 except 1% Excise tax. ($5,000 in
plan 1/1/91; 8% investment return; 28% marginal tax rate)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Date 8% Tax- 1% Excise Int. Payment Tax Savings P.V. of -P.V. of
Free Tax for from Int. Int. Tax
Account Excise Tax Deduction Payment Savings
Balance Borrowed @
8%
111/91 1 5000 .. -.
1/1192 5.400 S54 -..
1/93 5.832 $58 4 1 6 1
111194 6.299 $63 9 3 11 4
111/95 6.803 $68 14 4 16 4
11/96 7.347 $73 19 5 20 5
$316 $46 $13 $53 S14
Employer 3 has $7,347 in
$5,000 on 1/1/96.
Out-of-Pocket Cost:
Savings from Tax Benefits:
Net Gain:
"$5,000 (contribution)
x .28 (tax rate)










(Column 3; Excise Tax)
(Column 6; P.V. of Int. Paid)
(Column 7; P.V. of Savings)
(value of $5,000 deduction)
$1,400 (deduction savings)
Even with Excise tax as low as 1%, Employer 2 is better off than
Employer 3:
Employer 2 has a gain of $1,326. Employer 3 has a gain of
$1,045. Therefore, there is a $281 difference in Employer 3's eco-
nomic position as compared with Employer 2's.
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Part 4
Assume same as Employer 1 except NO EXCISE TAX. ($5,000 in
plan 1/1/91; 8% investment return; 28% marginal tax rate.)
1 2 3 4 5




1/1/92 5.400 - - -
1/1/93 5.832 -
1/194 6.299 - - -
111195 6.803 - - -
11196 7,347 -- -
Employer 4 has $7,347 in plan on 1/1/96 and takes deduction for
$5,000 on 1/1/96.
Pocket Gain is: $1,400" (deduction for contribution)
*$5,000 (contribution)
x .28 (tax rate)
$1,400 (deduction savings)
Employer 4 is only slightly better off than Employer 2, when same




Note: As discussed on page 57, investment performance outside the
plan is generally higher than inside plan. Therefore, it would be
unlikely that an employer would have some return inside the plan
as outside. See part 5.
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Part 5
Assume same as Employer 1 except 7.5% investment return in the
plan and 8% investment return outside plan. ($5,000 in plan
1/1/91; 28% marginal tax rate)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Date 7.5% Tax- 10% Int. Payment Tax Savings P.V. of P.V. of
Free Excise for from Int. Tax
Account Tax Excise Tax Deduction Payment Savings




1/1/92 5,375 $538 - - -
1/1/93 5,778 578 43 12 54 15
1/1/94 6,211 621 89 25 105 30
1/1/95 6.677 668 139 39 155 44
11/96 7,178 718 192 54 203 57
S3.123 $463 S130 $517 $146
Employer 5 has $7,178 in plan on 1/11/96 and takes deduction for
$5,000 on 11/96. Employer 5 makes additional deductible contri-
bution of $169 to plan so that there is $7,347 in plan on 1/1/96.
Out-of-Pocket Cost is:
$3,123 (Column 3)




Savings from Tax Benefits:
$ 146 (Column 7)
+/,400 (value of deduction)
$1,546






x .28 x .28
1,400 47
Employer 5 is much worse off than Employer 2. Employer 5 has a
cost of $2,216 and Employer 2 has a gain of $1,326.
Therefore, there is a $3,542 difference in Employer 5's economic
position as compared with Employer 2's.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Part 6
Assume same as Employer 5 except NO EXCISE TAX. ($5,000 in
plan 1/1/91; 7.5% investment return; 28% marginal tax rate.)
1 2 3 4 5
Date 7.5% Tax-Free No Excise
Account Tax
Balance
111/91 S5,000 - - -
111/92 5,375 - - -
1/193 5.778 - - -
1/1194 6,211 - - -
1/1195 6,677 - - -
111/96 7,178 - - -
Employer 6 has $7,178 in plan on 1/1/96 and takes a deduction for
$5,000 on 1/1/96. Employer 6 makes additional deductible contri-
bution of $169 to plan so that Employer 6 has $7,347 in plan on
1/1/96.
Pocket Gain is:
-$ 169 (additional contribution)
47* (deduction for additional contribution)
1/400 (deduction for original $5,000 contribution)
$1,278
*$5,000- *'$ 169
x .28 x .28
$1,400 47
Even with no EXCISE TAX and assuming as little as a .5% differ-
ence in investment performance, Employer 2 is still slightly better
off. Employer 2 has a gain of $1,326 and Employer 6 has a gain
of $1,278:
Therefore there is a $48 difference in Employer 6's economic
position as compared with Employer 2's.
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This example illustrates that even when equivalent interest
rates are assumed, under current law, an employer who accelerates
funding can be substantially worse off than an employer who in-
vests in an outside market and later makes a contribution to a
plan.29" ' In the first example, Employer 1 invested $5,000 in the
plan on 1/1/91 at which time the plan's assets had already reached
the full funding limitation. The contribution therefore will not be
deductible until 1/1/96, at which point the employer will take a
deduction for the $5,000 contribution. Thus, the employer will have
$7,347 in the pension plan and will have incurred an out-of-pocket
cost of $2,144.
In the second example, on 1/1/91, the plan's assets had also
reached the full funding limitation. Employer 2, however, invested
$5,000 in an outside market on 1/1/92 and on 11/96 will make a
deductible contribution of $7,347 to the pension plan. At this point,
Employer 2 will have $7,347 in the plan and will have a pocket
gain of $1,326.2"
In 1996, under the current funding law, which both delays the
deduction for the contribution and imposes a 10% excise tax, there
will be a $3,690 disparity between Employer 1 and Employer 2.
Part 3 of this example illustrates that an excise tax as low as
1%, assuming these same facts, would still leave the employer who
invests the additional $5,000 in the plan worse off than one who
invests the same amount outside the plan.
Part 4 of this example shows that the deferral of the deduction
alone is not sufficient to offset the additional tax benefit that re-
sulted from accelerating the funding of the plan by $5,000 in 1991
when the investment return outside the plan is as high as inside.
Therefore, it is necessary to calculate an excise tax to recapture the
additional savings.
Investment returns inside pension plans are generally signifi-
cantly less than those outside the plan.293 Part five shows that if a
slightly lower investment return of 7.5% is assumed inside the
plan, the results are different. The deferral of the deduction and the
291. It is more realistic to assume that the investment return inside the plan would not
be as high as that outside of the plan. See supra notes 259-61 and accompanying text.
This situation would make the disparity between Employer 1 and Employer 2 even great-
er. But for purposes of illustration, an 8% interest rate has been assumed in the above
example both in and outside the plan.
292. If the employer were to invest in a tax exempt fund, there would be no out-of-
pocket cost and the disparity would be greater between Employer I and Employer 2.
293. See part II.E for a discussion of Plan Investment Performance.
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10% excise tax increases the disparity between Employer 1 and
Employer 2. For Employer 5 to have $7,347 in the plan, Employer
5 must incur an out-of-pocket cost of $2,216 (which includes a
deductible additional contribution to the plan). This results in a
$3,542 difference between Employer 2 and Employer 5 at the
beginning of the plan year in 1997.
Finally, part six shows that when a slightly lower investment
return inside the plan is assumed, Employer 6 is worse off than
Employer 2 even in the absence of an excise tax. The deferral of
the deduction alone eliminates the additional savings from acceler-
ated funding. Part six shows that if Employer 6 makes an addition-
al contribution of $169 in order to secure $7,347 in the plan in
1996, Employer 6 will have a pocket gain of $1,278 which is still
$48 less than the pocket gain of Employer 2.
In the above illustrations, the period over which the plan was
overfunded was relatively brief, five years. Consequently, when a
slightly lower investment return is assumed, the tax-free build-up
of the contributions does not offset the delayed deduction. In other
examples where the excess funds remain in the plan for longer
periods of time, an excise tax may be necessary to recover the
gain from the tax-free build-up of the contribution.
The case-by-case approach calls for an individual calculation
of the appropriate excise tax rate. Under this approach, an excise
tax would apply only when the delayed deduction was not ade-
quate to treat employers who invest outside the plan similar to
employers who contribute comparable amounts to a plan in excess
of its full funding limitation. A determination of the specific effects
of the tax benefits afforded to qualified pension plans is necessary
in order to calculate such an excise tax rate. The use of an offset-
ting excise tax such as this creates a need for a substantial penalty
or excise tax when the employer fails to indicate that she has made
additional contributions, or that she has used extremely conserva-
tive actuarial assumptions. This additional tax is necessary to pre-
vent employers from using conservative rates to accomplish
overfunding without having to pay the offsetting excise tax affect-
ing overfunded plans. In other words, without a significant
deterrent, employers may make conservative projections and take
the chance that they will not be discovered on audit rather than
voluntarily pay the proposed offsetting excise tax.
The following discussion identifies the extent to which prefer-
ential tax treatment of pension plans results in tax gains that
should be recaptured when an employer overfunds. It also explores
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the conditions which make it advantageous for employers to ac-
celerate funding and proposes an offsetting excise tax that is rea-
sonably easy to administer and enforce.
F. Identifying the Tax Gains That Result
from Accelerated Funding
As discussed in part I of this Article, the two tax benefits
given to qualified pension plans are the accelerated deduction for
the employer and the tax-free build-up of the plan's assets.2' The
immediate deduction of plan contributions can provide a tax plan-
ning benefit to employers because they know exactly what the
deduction is worth in relationship to their current tax positions.
However, it does not truly provide an economic benefit unless
income tax rates decrease.295 A larger current deduction for addi-
tional contributions is more valuable to employers if they anticipate
that their respective tax rates will fall. That is, the employer would
achieve greater tax savings by accelerating funding and taking
earlier deductions at the higher tax rates. Conversely, when tax
rates are expected to increase, the employer will receive a greater
economic benefit by funding more slowly or taking a delayed
deduction for current funding so that the deductions could be taken
at the expected higher tax rates.296 Because current rates are rela-
tively low and expected to increase, it seems that employers would
not be inclined to accelerate funding in order to obtain immediate
deductions. Employers would derive a greater economic benefit by
funding more slowly and taking a deduction later so that larger
portions of their funding occurs when the tax rates are higher.
Thus, the tax-free build-up of plan assets presumably provides
a stronger incentive for employers to accelerate plan funding rather
than to defer it.2' The faster a plan is funded, the more time is
available for the tax-free build-up to accumulate. Stated differently,
the greater the time between the contribution and its later deduc-
tion, the greater the benefit for accelerating funding.299 In the il-
294. See supra text accompanying notes 4-5; see also Halperin, supra note 104, at 159-
60.
295. See Halperin, supra note 6, at 521-24 (explaining why this result occurs).
296. ld.; see also Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Timing of Taxes, 39 NAT'L TAx J. 499,
501-02 (1986) (discussing the economic benefits from timing deductions according to
changes in the tax rates).
297. VEAL & MACKtEWiCz; supra note 57, at 207 (criticizing the argument that the de-
ferral of taxation of pension fund earnings results in overfunding).
298. Halperin, supra note 6, at 510.
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lustration above, the period over which the plan was overfunded
was five years. Consequently, the tax-free build-up had a limited
effect on the employer's economic position. As time passes, how-
ever, the tax-free growth will increase resulting in smaller annual
contribution requirements. The longer the plan is overfunded, the
less the employer will be required to contribute to meet the mini-
mum funding requirements. Consequently, accelerated funding will
eventually result in additional tax benefits.
While the single most important goal of the pension program
is to encourage rank and file employees who could not ordinarily
do so to adequately save for retirement, the funding restrictions
placed on pension plans have more than one purpose. The funding
limitations ensure that sufficient amounts of assets are available
when benefits become payable, and they also limit the cost of the
pension program by limiting the tax-free build-up that any one
employer can receive in a given plan year."'
If the only purpose of the funding limitations were to prevent
employers from obtaining additional tax savings, and one believes
that the participants in fact fund the pension plans by accepting
lowered wages, then the additional tax-free build-up of the contri-
butions would not be disturbing, particularly in situations where
there were sufficient numbers of rank and file workers covered by
the plan to justify favorable tax treatment. This is so because in a
defined benefit plan the retirement benefits are not determined by
the investment performance of the plan assets. Consequently, actual
retirement benefits are not affected by the rate at which the plan is
funded."° The additional tax gain from accelerated funding would
provide greater savings to the plan participants at a lower cost. By
accelerating the funding of the plan, current wages would not have
to be cut as much to provide the same retirement benefit.3"' As a
matter of pension policy, the additional tax benefits resulting from
the longer growth period would not be inappropriate and, in fact,
would seem more consistent with the goals of ERISA than the
current, funding limitations.
However, limiting the employer's tax benefit is not the only
299. See H.R. Rep. No. 391, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1, 2313-601, 612 (discussing reasons for pension law).
300. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text for description of the funding of a
defined benefit plan.
301. For discussion of the effect of pension contributions on current wages, see supra
text accompanying notes 126-36.
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purpose for the funding limitations. An equally important purpose
is to reduce the cost of the pension program. This reality makes it
necessary to reach a different conclusion with respect to the
overfunding issue. While the additional tax benefits may leave
workers better off, the additional tax benefits, nevertheless, increase
the cost of the pension program. Therefore, to the extent that
policymakers attempt to reduce tax expenditures for qualified pen-
sion plans, accelerated funding is a problem. In looking for alterna-
tives to current law that neither favor nor disfavor overfunding, it
is necessary to identify methods by which the additional tax gains
attributable to accelerated funding can be properly identified and
recovered so that the cost of the pension program does not soar.
G. Alternative Methods to Recapture the Tax Gains
Attributed to Overfunded Amounts
Because the most important aspect of the preferential treatment
of pension plans is the tax-free build-up of investment earnings,
any approach designed neither to favor nor to disfavor accelerated
funding would have to recapture gains resulting from the tax-free
growth of excess plan assets. The accumulated earnings on excess
assets are a function of several variables such as the period over
which the plan was overfunded, the investment return, and the
employer's marginal tax rate.2 In order to accurately recover lost
revenue, an alternative method of taxation would have to identify
and measure all of the relevant factors before recovery could occur.
One way of calculating the additional tax benefit from acceler-
ated funding is to use the plan's actual investment rate of return
and compare that to an average outside investment rate. The impo-
sition of an excise tax that annually equates the value of a plan's
excess assets with a hypothetical account of the same excess assets
that have been invested in comparable outside markets at regular
tax rates would accomplish this goal. To compute such an offset-
ting excise tax, the following calculations are necessary: (1) an
annual appraisal of the plan's excess assets; (2) a calculation of the
annual growth of the excess assets; and (3) a determination of the
yearly tax savings on the tax-free build-up inside the plan based
upon comparison to taxable outside sources. An excise tax so cal-
culated could offset the tax-free build-up of the excess contribu-
tions while the plan is overfunded. Once the plan ceases to be
302. See GAO Report, supra note 160, at 5-6.
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overfunded, the original contribution, along with the build-up, is
deductible.
1. Annual Appraisal of the Plan's Excess Assets
The difference between a plan's assets and a plan's accrued
liabilities determines whether the plan is overfunded. 3 A plan's
funding position is presently calculated by using the current liabili-
ty concept which is based upon the present value of accrued bene-
fits rather than the present value of expected benefits."l The cur-
rent liability concept is designed to reduce the deductible contribu-
tion level. As a result, employers are required to make greater pay-
ments later rather than smaller payments sooner. Because the cur-
rent liability concept can understate the cost of the plan, it could
not reasonably serve as the basis for a policy that facilitates greater
funding flexibility. For purposes of designing an alternative method
of taxation to liberalize funding practices, it is more appropriate to
use the present value of projected benefits, rather than the current
liability.
For purposes of identifying funding surpluses, amounts attrib-
utable to extremely conservative actuarial assumptions should also
be considered. While the use of conservative interest rate assump-
tions may be justifiable, lower investment yield assumptions never-
theless allow greater contributions and generate greater tax
benefits."5 Unless overfunding is defined also to include amounts
resulting from the use of extremely conservative assumptions, em-
ployers will be encouraged to overfund using this method as op-
posed to overfunding by making contributions in excess of the
limitations. Because both practices reach the same result, a faster
tax-free build-up, employers who accelerate funding by using con-
servative actuarial assumptions should be treated similarly to em-
ployers who accelerate funding by contributing in excess of the full
funding limitation.
The case-by-case approach calculates an offsetting excise tax
which applies when employers chose to accelerate funding. This
offsetting tax is designed to leave the employer neither better off
nor worse off for overfunding. The offsetting excise tax could be
303. See supra text accompanying notes 67-72 for a discussion of the full funding
limitation or "overfunding."
304. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
305. For a discussion of the use of conservative interest rate assumptions, see supra text
accompanying notes 77-80.
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effective only in cases where the employer indicates that the plan
is being overfunded by additional contributions or the use of ex-
tremely conservative actuarial assumptions. As a result, if the em-
ployer were to use conservative assumptions and claim they were
reasonable based on the unique facts and circumstances of the
plan's investment history, for example, the offsetting excise tax
would not apply. Thus, in this situation the employer clearly would
be better off by overfunding. To avoid this result, it would be
necessary to apply a substantial penalty in situations where conser-
vative rates were used but not acknowledged by the employer.
Thus, employers would be discouraged from taking the risk of not
being discovered. For example, if an additional tax of 25% were
imposed on overfunded amounts which had not been reported, the
temptation for the employer to play "audit roulette" would drasti-
cally diminish.
In order to implement such a system, employers would have
to know what assumptions the IRS considers unreasonable or "un-
safe" for purposes of the offsetting excise tax. One solution is for
Congress to publish annually "safe harbor" interests rates and other
actuarial assumptions. The interest rate assumption could be defined
in terms of the effective rates for Treasury notes. Alternatively,
these rates could be defined numerically. In any event, assumptions
falling outside these guidelines would be in "unsafe harbors." Some
employers and actuaries would resist this proposal out of concern
that "unsafe harbors" such as these are too restrictive and do not
allow for special facts and circumstances which make the use of
conservative assumptions reasonable. In response to these types of
concerns, it would be necessary to have a process which allowed
the employer who uses extremely conservative actuarial assump-
tions, which in fact are reasonable, to apply in advance for some
type of relief.
In order to measure the surplus that results from the use of
conservative assumptions, it is necessary to compare contributions
based on reasonable assumptions to contributions based on conser-
vative assumptions. Plans using rates that fall in "unsafe" ranges
would have excess assets equaling the difference in what would
have accumulated under reasonable assumptions and what, in fact,
accumulated under the plan's conservative rates. In other words,
there is a presumption that the use of actuarial assumptions falling
within an "unsafe" range are unreasonable and would have to be
justified by the employer or the actuary. The inability to justify
such rates would then cause a penalty to apply to the excess
19931
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amounts. Without a penalty for the use of unreasonably conser-
vative actuarial assumptions, employers would be encouraged to
accelerate funding through the use of conservative rates rather than
contributing in excess of the funding limitations. This is so because
the conservative rates, if not challenged on audit, would go unde-
tected. As a result, these employers would not be required to pay
the offsetting excise tax that they would otherwise have to pay had
they made contributions in excess of the funding limitations under
the case-by-case approach. In order not to favor employers who
accelerate funding over those who do not, the excess should not be
currently deductible, and such amounts could be properly carried
forward to future plan years.
2. Calculation of the Annual Growth Rate
The portion of plan assets that comprises the additional tax
benefit attributable to excess funds is affected by the rate of return
on pension assets. Because the tax treatment of income varies
widely depending on the type of investment, it is necessary to
differentiate among the various sources of plan income in order to
properly allocate tax gains to surplus amounts. The investment
experience of the plan is annually documented on the schedule B,
Form 5500.3 One method of estimation is to allocate the plan's
investment return so that a proportional amount of the growth is
attributable to the surplus. .For example, assume that a plan has
total assets of $100,000 and is overfunded by $20,000. If the aver-
age investment income yield on a plan's assets in a given year is
8% or $8,000, 20% or $1,600 of the plan's growth is attributable
to the excess assets and, therefore, used for purposes of calculating
the offsetting excise tax. Alternatively, pre-determined investment
return estimates can be used for this purpose. However, the use of
average corporate taxable investments yields would probably over-
state the investment return of pension assets because of differences
in the respective management practices.
3. Tax Rates and Timing
In order to determine the tax savings received by an employer
from the accumulation of excess assets in a plan, it is necessary to
306. Form 5500 includes information on the operation of the plan. Specifically, Form
5500 contains "identifying information, statistics on participants, a balance sheet, a state-
ment of income and expense, and other information about the operation of the plan."
McGILL & GRUBBS. supra note 19, at 65.
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treat the surplus accumulation as if it had been invested in a tax-
able instrument outside the plan. The employer's tax rate at the
time the plan is overfunded affects the extent to which tax gains
result from overfunding and is the real measurement of the tax
benefit. Thus, for comparison purposes, one must identify the ap-
plicable tax rate which would have applied to the growth of a
plan's excess assets had they been invested in an outside taxable
instrument. This rate then applies to the earnings of the surplus
assets. Because outside investments vary in investment yield, many
of which are tax exempt, it is difficult to calculate an overall out-
side, after-tax rate of return. Here again, an average rate could be
used to approximate outside investment performance.
The timing of the offsetting tax is another aspect of this pro-
posal which must be considered. Requiring that the above deter-
minations be made on a yearly basis, or one consistent with the
frequency of actuarial valuations, suggests that the tax be imposed
at the same time." Thus, if the above determinations are made
every two years when the plan's valuations are performed, the tax
would become payable at such time.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the excise tax under section 4972 currently applies to
all nondeductible contributions, the 10% rate appears to have been
determined arbitrarily rather than methodically. As a result, it ap-
plies in all overfunded situations regardless of whether a tax gain
has actually occurred or' not. Under current law, employers have no
realistic option of accelerating funding since such action will gener-
ally leave the employers worse off.
In contrast, an individually-calculated excise tax would take
into account the various items that determine whether and to what
extent an additional tax benefit actually results from a given in-
stance of overfunding. The recording and reporting for such a tax
are fairly simple and impose little additional burdens on employers,
since the underlying calculations needed to make the necessary
determinations are already reported in accounting statements, Form
5500, as well as in actuarial valuations.
307. Sponsors of defined benefit plans are required to perform actuarial valuations every
three years. I.R.C. § 412(c)(2) (1988) (giving method for valuing plan assets), and
§ 6059(a) (requiring an actuarial report to be filed every three years after filing a report
following the first year of the plan).
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The 10% fixed excise rate or any other fixed rate which better
approximates the tax gains generated by excess amounts in pension
plans should, however, remain an option for employers who would
rather not have the additional recording and reporting responsibility
required by an individually-calculated excise tax. Employers should
therefore have a choice between accelerating funding or not, as
well as a choice between using a fixed excise tax rate or not.
Relative to the tax treatment of comparable investments out-
side a plan, the proposed offsetting excise tax neither favors nor
disfavors accelerated funding. As demonstrated, the disallowance of
a deduction in many situations is sufficient to treat, for tax purpos-
es, excess assets invested in a plan similar to amounts invested
outside the plan. In the remaining cases, the period of time over
which the excess assets are sheltered in the plan causes a greater
benefit from overfunding. Thus, it is necessary to measure the tax
gains generated by the overfunding and determine an excise tax
which accurately recaptures the additional gain. The individually-
calculated excise tax accomplishes this task and is administratively
feasible since it overlaps other already-existing reporting require-
ments.
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